

**FREEDOM OF INFORMATION  
AND  
PRIVACY ACTS**

**SUBJECT: CUSTODIAL DETENTION  
SECURITY INDEX**

**FILE NUMBER: 100-358086**

**SECTION : 31**



**FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**

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## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: October 25,  
1954

FROM :

SUBJECT: SUGGESTION NUMBER 949-54

## SECURITY INDEX

DETAILS:

Attached is Suggestion Number 949-54, originating with the New York Office, which recommends that IBM cards be prepared on all Security Index subjects codifying them as to physical description. The suggestion further recommends that the cards set out complete descriptions sufficiently generalized to incorporate persons falling within definite physical categories according to height, weight, hair and other identifying features.

It is stated that the suggestion would assist in identifying individuals encountered on surveillances or who are included in informant reports but whose identities are unknown to surveilling agents or the informants concerned. It is stated that at the present time such persons are identified by the process of reviewing available photographs on Security Index cards or photographs of missing Communists. Under this suggestion, descriptions of such unknown subjects encountered in the field would be furnished to the Bureau and it is assumed that processing of the proposed IBM cards would produce logical suspects.

We are commenting herein on only that phase of the suggestion relating to the Security Index, it being noted that this suggestion on page 4 indicates that it might be given a broader application (such as in the criminal field).

The Internal Security Section does not favor the adoption of the suggestion for the following reasons:

- (1) As of October 15, 1954, there were exactly 25,000 subjects on the Security Index. It is felt that the very size of the Security Index is a factor that is to be considered in an outset since the processing of the IBM cards for the entire Security Index is a problem in itself.

(2) The Bureau does not, at the present time, maintain physical descriptions on the reverse side of Security Index cards as is required in the field. For this reason, complete descriptive data would have to be procured from the field for the preparation of the IBM cards. As you know, physical descriptions will be placed on the reverse side of the duplicate set of Security Index cards maintained at Quantico and the method of handling this particular project is the subject of a recent memorandum which has not as yet been approved. It is pointed out, however, that descriptive data and the photographs will be affixed to the card at Quantico as part of the Bureau's over-all war plans in the event individual field offices were destroyed in a national emergency.

(3) Physical descriptions are subject to change. We require that individual Security Index subjects be physically observed by Special Agents. This is not a continuing requirement, however, and the possibility exists that once a subject is observed by Bureau Agents he may not again be seen by Bureau Agents for months or even years unless his case becomes the subject of an investigation requiring a physical surveillance. In other words, the appearance of Security Index subjects may not only change with the passage of time but, in addition, there have been numerous instances of Security Index subjects actually altering their appearances drastically. Thus, the use of codified physical descriptive data has serious limitations unless augmented by photographs.

(4) We concur with the observation of the SAC at New York on page 1a of the attached against adoption of the suggestion. The SAC states "It is believed that the work involved in following out this suggestion would not merit the end results. If a person did show up in any field division territory under such circumstances to indicate he might be a Security Index subject from another office, it would require the Bureau to check the individual by description through the IBM cards and thereafter write the various offices who had SI subjects answering such description. The offices would then have to check to determine whether these individuals were still in the territory if they were not already known to be missing. I do not recommend this suggestion be put into effect."

(5) In summary, it is felt that the type of individuals included in the Security Index is not amenable to physical codification on the same basis as criminal subjects. That is to say, the latter may be categorized according to specific acts of violence he has committed, establishing a modus operandi. In these instances, as cited on page A of

of the attached, the IBM system is in fact predicated largely upon modus operandi with physical characteristics as auxiliary features. With regard to Security Index subjects, reliance must be placed exclusively upon the physical descriptions, obtained in most instances under less than ideal conditions.

Observation

Because of the scope of the process of preparing and maintaining these cards, it is not possible to estimate the savings to the Bureau in the adoption of this suggestion. This problem is treated on page B of the attached.

I should like to call your attention to another suggestion, Number 941-54, originating with the New York Office and which is being treated in a separate memorandum. Suggestion Number 941-54 also deals with the problem of the location of missing security subjects and the identification of unknown subjects operating in the Communist Party underground but recommends more extensive use of photographs. It proposes to distribute to all field offices identical copies of photographs maintained in the Extension of the Communist Album at the Bureau, pointing up the limits inherent in the use of physical descriptions to attempt to make identification in these cases. It is stated that physical descriptions vary directly with the observer's attention to details and is of particular concern in attempting to utilize descriptions submitted by Bureau informants.

Descriptive data maintained in the field on the reverse side of the Security Index cards are obtained from confidential informants and as a result of physical observation of subjects by Bureau Agents, augmented by descriptive data appearing, e.g., in employment or military records. As noted above, the physical description as reported by informants may be inaccurate and the observations by Special Agents are not under ideal circumstances. That is to say, the subjects are not under close scrutiny so as to allow for the development of accurate data, unless, of course, the subject has been placed under arrest, photographed, observed closely and fingerprinted.

Based on the foregoing, it does not appear that Suggestion Number 949-54, relating to IBM cards on Security Index subjects, should be adopted.

RECOMMENDATION:

That this memorandum be referred to the Training and Inspection Division to advise that the Internal Security Section does not favor the adoption of Suggestion Number 949-54.



UNRECORDED

November 9, 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR MR.

MR.

MR.

MR.

Today in conference with the Attorney General he informed me that yesterday at the staff luncheon, at which I was not present, there had been a round-table discussion about the Responsibilities Program and that it was the thinking of those at the luncheon that the Program should not be completely abolished but that information should be furnished to the respective Governors about persons who may be working in areas which affect the security of the United States when such persons are of a present danger to the United States in time of national emergency. The Attorney General stated that it was believed by those at the luncheon participating in this discussion that the dissemination of information to Governors about persons employed in educational institutions should just be discontinued without any announcement or indication to that effect. The Attorney General stated he had in mind drafting a proposed directive to me along those lines and would send it around to me to see informally before he made it a formal directive.

The Attorney General asked me what I thought about the views as he had expressed them to me. I told the Attorney General, of course, that the Bureau would abide by whatever his decision was in this matter but that I did want to point out to him that the principal motivation upon the part of the Governors when they called to see me some years ago, and out of which meeting grew the Responsibilities Program, was to obtain information about persons teaching in state institutions as well as persons working in key areas for the state. I particularly related to him the concern of then Governor [redacted] of Illinois that state legislators were starting to move toward investigation of state educational institutions as to subversives in such institutions and that he, the Governor, felt that this would tend to create a certain amount of witch-hunting whereas if Governors could be furnished, on a strictly confidential basis, information from the FBI, they could protect themselves from ill-considered and unwarranted inquiries by well-meaning legislators and patriotic groups.

I also told the Attorney General that, of course, all of the persons upon whom reports had been made to Governors were concerning [redacted] whose names were on our Security Index to be arrested in time of national emergency and that therefore they were basically dangerous to the [redacted]

security of the country. I stated that furthermore, it seemed fundamental to me that a teacher in an educational institution who was so dangerous in the estimation of the FBI as to warrant inclusion in the Security Index was certainly

in a dangerous position of poisoning the minds of the youth of this country and that it was a shame that such persons would be allowed to continue in such educational institutions without at least some alerting of a Governor of a state about this situation.

I pointed out to the Attorney General that the present controversy seems to have arisen out of the situation in Colorado and that I was at a loss to understand why the Board of Education which had sparked this controversy had not given as much attention to finding out who the Communists were as they were giving to finding out who furnished the information to the Governor of Colorado. I stated it was never understood at the time the conference was held with the Governors that the FBI's identity would be disclosed but that the information would be furnished by the FBI merely to alert the Governors, upon which that individual could predicate any necessary investigation to establish the facts.

I told the Attorney General that there were several instances in which the Bureau had been embarrassed by a breach of confidence upon the part of the person or persons to whom the information had been furnished by the FBI but that in those instances we had discontinued further dissemination of information. I told the Attorney General I did not believe that we could discontinue that portion of the Program of furnishing information about persons employed in educational institutions without it becoming known eventually and we would be faced with having to admit that we had discontinued such a Program.

The Attorney General stated that some of these aspects had not been brought out in the discussion at the staff luncheon yesterday and in view of this he felt that no directive should be issued to the FBI at this time about this matter but that we should continue to carry out the Program as we have in the past, maybe exercising more discriminating judgment as to the dissemination of information pertaining to persons employed in educational institutions.

Therefore, in view of the Attorney General's views about this matter, we will resume the dissemination of information to the Governors but I think it would be well to direct our SAC's to again contact the Governors and caution them about the confidential character of the information which is to be received. No information is to be furnished to state officials who have in the past breached our confidence nor to persons about whom there may be some question as to their own security standings such as the newly elected Governor of

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover



## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: November 12,  
1954

FROM :

SUBJECT: DELINQUENCY IN SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS

SYNOPSIS:

Each month we follow the field closely on the status of security work by analyzing the backlog of pending cases and delinquency in Espionage, Internal Security, Security Matter and foreign intelligence cases in classifications 100 and 105. Status of these cases as of October 31, 1954, is set forth herein.

Pending active matters in the entire field in the security classifications decreased from 23,011 to 22,452. Delinquent matters decreased from 6,720 to 6,413, with the resultant over-all statistical decrease from 29.1 per cent to 28.5 per cent. The delinquency in security cases in the New York Office decreased from 1,822 to 1,630, a delinquency of 30.9 per cent. The number of pending active matters in the 100 classification decreased in the New York Office from 4,237 to 3,977 and the delinquent items in this classification decreased from 1,497 to 1,373 or statistical delinquency of 35 per cent. The 30.9 per cent of delinquency in the security classifications of the New York Office is the lowest percentage of delinquency in these classifications since the Bureau has, on a regular basis, been following the field in this matter.

Letters are being sent to 15 offices either instructing them to reduce backlog and delinquency or, in some cases commenting upon their progress in bringing their security cases to current status.

RECOMMENDATION:

The field will continue to be followed closely in this matter and you will be advised of the results of the review of the November, 1954, administrative reports.

Bufile



DETAILS:

Since December, 1951, we have been following, on a monthly basis, the twelve field offices having a large proportion of our pending security work and since March, 1952, all offices. We have written letters to the twelve offices and to other offices where progress in reducing the backlog of work and delinquency has not been satisfactory.

The October, 1954, administrative reports from all offices reflect that the total pending active matters in the classifications 65, 100 and 105 decreased during this month from 23,011 to 22,453. The delinquent items decreased from 6,720 to 6,413, which represents a statistical decrease of from 29.1 per cent to 28.5 per cent.

The following statistics reflect the status of pending work including both pending active and pending inactive matters and delinquency for all field divisions as of December 31, 1951, and the progress for the last four months:

TOTAL PENDING MATTERS  
CLASSIFICATIONS 65, 100 and 105  
ALL FIELD DIVISIONS

<u>Classification</u>	<u>12-31-51</u>	<u>7-31-54</u>	<u>8-31-54</u>	<u>9-30-54</u>	<u>10-31-54</u>
65	1,314	1,090	1,056	1,060	1,066
100	32,812	21,013	21,484	21,807	21,911
105	2,895	4,542	3,760	3,588	3,428
Total	37,021	26,645	26,300	26,455	26,405

TOTAL DELINQUENT MATTERS  
CLASSIFICATIONS 65, 100 and 105  
ALL FIELD DIVISIONS

<u>Classification</u>	<u>12-31-51</u>	<u>7-31-54</u>	<u>8-31-54</u>	<u>9-30-54</u>	<u>10-31-54</u>
65	525	229	184	172	163
100	22,518	6,106	5,928	5,758	5,580
105	1,719	828	898	790	670
Total	24,762	7,163	7,010	6,720	6,413

The following statistics reflect the total of pending active matters, delinquency and percentage of delinquency of all offices since January 31, 1953.

CLASSIFICATIONS 65, 100 and 105  
ALL DELINQUENT MATTERS

<u>Date</u>	<u>Pending Active Matters</u>	<u>Delinquent Matters</u>	<u>Percentage Delinquent</u>
1-31-53	24,098	11,772	48.8%
2-28-53	22,935	11,233	46.9%
3-31-53	23,033	10,890	47.3%
4-30-53	22,100	9,120	41.3%
5-31-53	21,740	9,730	44.8%
6-30-53	20,970	9,558	45.6%
7-31-53	20,180	9,411	46.6%
8-31-53	19,493	8,495	43.6%
9-30-53	19,224	7,571	39.4%
10-31-53	19,141	5,580	34.3%
11-30-53	19,833	6,655	33.5%
12-31-53	19,947	6,749	33.8%
1-31-54	20,520	7,494	36.5%
2-28-54	21,488	6,007	27.9%
3-31-54	21,848	6,617	30.2%
4-30-54	21,752	6,757	31.0%
5-31-54	21,863	7,822	35.8%
6-30-54	22,278	7,407	33.2%
7-31-54	22,977	7,163	31.2%
8-31-54	22,361	7,010	31.3%
9-30-54	23,011	6,720	29.1%
10-31-54	22,452	6,413	28.5%

Status of Security Work in Twelve of the Larger Offices

The following statistics reflect the progress of the twelve larger offices we have been closely following since December, 1951. These offices have approximately 81 per cent of the total Security Index cards and a high percentage of the pending work and delinquency in classifications 65, 100 and 105.

**STATISTICS FOR TWELVE OFFICES  
SECURITY INDEX COUNT AND FOR  
65, 100 and 105 MATTERS**

<u>Office</u>	<u>Security Index Cards 10-15-54</u>	<u>Pending Active Matters</u>		<u>Percentage Delinquent</u>	
		<u>9-30-54</u>	<u>10-31-54</u>	<u>9-30-54</u>	<u>10-31-54</u>
* New York	6,789	5,632	5,301	32%	30.9%
* Los Angeles	4,107	2,011	1,973	44%	39%
* San Francisco	2,317	1,729	1,611	41%	39%
* Chicago	1,543	1,407	1,389	28%	30%
Detroit	1,359	858	917	46%	25%
Philadelphia	1,191	1,013	992	20%	25%
* Newark	881	1,188	1,179	27%	28%
* Cleveland	683	459	464	27%	33%
Seattle	668	368	358	29%	25%
* Boston	675	744	802	24%	28%
* New Haven	536	604	624	19%	26%
Minneapolis	523	288	248	18%	21%
	<u>21,272</u>	<u>16,301</u>	<u>15,858</u>		

\* Letters being sent to offices indicated. See page 8 herein.

The over-all statistics for the eleven offices other than the New York Office since August 31, 1952, are as follows:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Pending Active Matters(65-100-105)</u>	<u>Delinquent Matters(65-100-105)</u>	<u>Percentage Delin- quent(65-100-105)</u>
8-31-52	12,611	7,589	60.2%
9-30-52	11,367	5,732	50.4%
10-31-52	11,286	4,957	43.9%

<u>Date</u>	<u>Pending Active Matters (65-100-105)</u>	<u>Delinquent Matters(65-100-105)</u>	<u>Percentage Delin- quent(65-100-105)</u>
11-30-52	11,148	4,844	43.5%
12-31-52	10,937	4,573	41.9%
1-31-53	10,730	4,626	43.0%
2-28-53	10,721	4,358	40.6%
3-31-53	10,069	4,019	39.9%
4-30-53	9,411	2,887	30.7%
5-31-53	9,277	3,447	37.2%
6-30-53	8,964	3,532	39.4%
7-31-53	8,908	3,758	42.2%
8-31-53	8,547	3,618	42.3%
9-30-53	8,601	3,249	37.8%
10-31-53	8,845	2,785	31.4%
11-30-53	9,434	2,871	30.4%
12-31-53	9,552	3,261	34.1%
1-31-54	9,814	3,318	33.6%
2-28-54	10,288	3,021	29.4%
3-31-54	10,188	2,998	29.4%
4-30-54	10,201	3,209	31.5%
5-31-54	9,840	3,920	39.8%
6-30-54	9,839	3,679	37.5%
7-31-54	10,317	3,348	32.4%
8-31-54	10,048	3,364	33.4%
9-30-54	10,669	3,488	32.7%
10-31-54	10,557	3,376	31.9%

New York Office

During 1953, the New York Office made a steady reduction in delinquent matters in the security classifications as well as a steady reduction in the case backlog. During November, 1953, the security delinquency dropped below 50 per cent for the first time in 1953 to 47 per cent. This was reduced even further in December to 43 per cent as compared with January, 1953, delinquency of 76 per cent in the security classifications. In January, 1954, the New York delinquency rose to 53 per cent. It was reduced, however, in February, 1954, to 32 per cent and during the period March through September, 1954, averaged 38 per cent. It should be noted that the October, 1954, delinquency of 30.9 per cent is the lowest percentage of delinquency in the security classifications which has existed in the New York Office since this matter has been followed on a regular basis by the Bureau.

The October, 1954, administrative report reveals that its security delinquency decreased during the past month from 32 per cent to 30.9 per cent. The pending active security cases decreased in the New York Office from 5,632 for September, 1954, to 5,301 for October, 1954. Delinquent items decreased from 1,822 as of September, 1954, to 1,639 as of October, 1954.

The New York Office has approximately 24 per cent of the pending active matters in the 65, 100 and 105 classifications in the entire field. This office has approximately 26 per cent of the number of delinquent items in these classifications throughout the field. The average delinquency in all other offices as the end of October, 1954, was approximately 20 per cent. The New York delinquency was 30.9 per cent as previously noted.

The bulk of the New York backlog and delinquency is in the 100 classification. During October, 1954, the number of pending active matters in the 100 classification in the New York Office decreased from 4,237 to 3,977. The number of delinquent matters in this classification decreased from 1,497 to 1,373 with no change from the 35 per cent for September, 1954.

Status of Security Work in the Remaining Forty Offices

The remaining forty offices are listed according to the percentage of delinquency on October 31, 1954, in total matters in classifications 65, 100 and 105. These statistics reflect the progress during October, 1954. It should be noted that many of the smaller offices have no pending matters in classifications 65 and 105 and their entire pending backlog is in classification 100 matters.

Office	Active Matters		Percentage Delinquent	
	9-30-54	10-31-54	9-30-54	10-31-54
* Albuquerque	126	103	15%	33%
* El Paso	56	43	23%	32%
* Louisville	61	57	23%	30%
* Norfolk	49	45	32%	30%
* Baltimore	532	670	24%	29%
* Phoenix	66	67	18%	28%
* Salt Lake City	58	67	29%	28%
Memphis	51	49	35%	26%
Pittsburgh	403	374	22%	25%
Cincinnati	382	379	20%	24%
Houston	67	54	30%	24%
Washington Field	1,092	985	25%	24%
New Orleans	99	132	30%	23%
Indianapolis	149	159	34%	23%
Dallas	87	83	39%	22%
Buffalo	700	690	12%	22%
Atlanta	58	69	24%	22%
San Juan	200	172	18%	22%
Richmond	88	73	20%	22%
Kansas City	56	52	1%	22%
Albany	311	293	19%	20%
Charlotte	97	106	29%	19%
Butte	29	52	27%	17%
Miami	199	198	27%	17%
Springfield	106	100	26%	17%
Denver	149	172	23%	15%
Portland	155	141	4%	15%
Birmingham	37	36	19%	14%
Omaha	62	60	35%	13%
St. Louis	312	265	16%	13%
Anchorage	41	34	17%	12%
Milwaukee	302	262	20%	11%
Mobile	54	45	19%	11%
Oklahoma City	54	53	11%	11%
San Antonio	46	52	28%	11%
San Diego	213	245	16%	10%
Knoxville	37	36	29%	8%
Savannah	24	29	4%	17%
Little Rock	22	30	25%	7%
Honolulu	40	24	12%	4%

\* Letters sent to offices indicated regarding delinquent status.  
 See page 8 herein.

The following figures illustrate the progress of the forty offices as a whole since June 30, 1952, as reflected in the administrative reports.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Pending Active Matters (65-100-105)</u>	<u>Delinquent Matters (65-100-105)</u>	<u>Percentage Delinquent</u>
6-30-52	8,417	3,842	45.6%
7-31-52	7,778	3,156	40.6%
8-31-52	6,928	3,054	44.0%
9-30-52	6,198	2,109	34.0%
10-31-52	6,126	1,279	20.8%
11-30-52	6,129	1,703	27.8%
12-31-52	6,228	1,691	27.2%
1-31-53	6,080	1,554	25.6%
2-28-53	6,103	1,515	24.6%
3-31-53	5,936	1,542	26.0%
4-30-53	5,864	1,414	24.1%
5-31-53	4,897	1,726	29.3%
6-30-53	5,611	1,577	28.1%
7-31-53	5,146	1,358	26.4%
8-31-53	5,095	1,323	26.0%
9-30-53	5,050	1,219	24.1%
10-31-53	4,987	1,087	21.8%
11-30-53	5,180	1,355	26.1%
12-31-53	5,260	1,301	24.6%
1-31-54	5,562	1,444	25.9%
2-28-54	5,997	1,347	22.5%
3-31-54	6,079	1,431	23.5%
4-30-54	6,174	1,327	21.5%
5-31-54	6,733	1,710	25.4%
6-30-54	7,022	1,522	21.6%
7-31-54	6,910	1,590	23.0%
8-31-54	6,728	1,520	22.5%
9-30-54	6,710	1,410	21.0%
10-31-54	6,594	1,398	21.2%

Letters to the Field

As noted previously, we are sending letters to 15 offices either instructing them to take appropriate measures to bring the investigations in the security classifications to, or maintain them in a current status. Letters are being directed to the offices indicated by asterisks on pages four and seven herein. It will be noted that the security delinquency of those offices for the month of October, 1954, appears in the extreme right hand column of the two lists on pages four and seven.

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: November 16, 1954

TO :

FROM :

SUBJECT: DELINQUENCY IN SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS

REACTIVATION OF CASES FOR PERIODIC REPORTS

Attached is a memorandum from the SAC at Chicago dated November 9, 1954, suggesting that where six-month periodic reports are required in the security field on organizations, Key Figures (subversive leaders on a local scale), Key Facilities cases (Security Index subjects having access to Key Facilities designated by the Secretary of Defense) and Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 cases, consideration be given to instructing the field that such cases be removed from a pending-inactive status and made pending active for the preparation of supplemental reports 45 days prior to the date the reports are due.

To the observations of the SAC, the Director commented: "Give careful consideration."

Observation:

The problem presented by Chicago is only indirectly one of delinquency. It primarily raises the question as to whether the periodic reports should be submitted six months from the date of the last report or whether the cases should be reactivated six months from the date of the last report for the preparation of the periodic report.

In Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 cases no time is designated in present instructions as to when supplemental reports should be submitted. Each case depends on the facts as to whether additional active investigation should be conducted. A report submitted due to an accumulation of information which has been channeled to the case file. If reports in these cases are to be submitted, of course, the cases should be reactivated for that purpose while the reports are being prepared.

Under present instructions, reports on subversive organizations are required to be submitted every six months. In Key Facilities cases, instructions state that the cases should be placed in a pending-inactive status six months from the date of the last report in the cases for the submission of current supplemental reports.

Attachments



Although this question has not been raised by other offices, it appears desirable, in order to simplify field administration, to have uniform instructions to apply to all security-type cases in which periodic reports are required. Due to the importance of security-type cases in which periodic reports are required, it is recommended that the field be instructed to reactivate such cases 45 days prior to the due date in order that reports will be submitted at the designated time unless due to the facts in the cases more frequent reporting is necessary.

**ACTION:**

If you approve, there is attached an SAC Letter and appropriate manual changes in line with the above comments. There is also attached a letter to the SAC at Chicago.

**ADDENDUM: 11/17/54**

This change will not increase the number of pending cases in the field but will merely result in changing the cases from pending-inactive to a pending-active status 45 days before the end of the period for which the report is required.

OK  
H.

UNRECORDED  
11-9-54

*4*  
*Security Index*

(P) SECURITY INDEX -- In the future Security Index cards prepared at the Bureau and forwarded to your office will contain on the reverse sides printed captions by which you may list physical descriptive data concerning your Security Index subjects as presently required in accordance with provisions of the Manual of Instructions, Section 87C, 7b. (5).

You are not limited to the data suggested by the printed captions and specific notations should continue to be made on your cards as outlined in SAC Letter 54-26 (T) of May 12, 1954. You must, for instance, continue to affix photographs, make appropriate notations that a Security Index card has been posted, list any dangerous characteristics of the subject, indicate possession of firearms and any other data which would be an aid in effecting the apprehension of the subjects concerned.

cc - Mr. [redacted]  
cc - Mr. [redacted]

Assistant Attorney General

November 18, 1954

Director, FBI

SECURITY INDEX LIST

There is attached hereto a current list of the names of the individuals maintained in the Security Index. Names included in the main portion of the list are arranged alphabetically. The names of individuals coming within five designated groups are listed on separate pages. Following each name is information reflecting the race, sex, birth date, Bureau file number and the Bureau field office covering the residence of the individual.

It is requested that this list be given utmost security.

Attachment

NOTE ON YELLOW ONLY:

Espionage Section of the Special Section not included. The five designated groups are:

- Foreign Government Employees
- United Nations Employees
- Pro-Tito Yugoslavs
- U. S. Government Employees
- Atomic Energy Program Employees

*Delivered to [redacted] 11/19/54  
to Mr. Tolson  
via Mr. Robinson  
Dec list  
11/19/54*

RGO:mjt  
(5)

RECORDED-68

NOV 19 1954  
132

*Dr. [redacted]*

1782

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: 11/19/54

TO :

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

During the past week 98 cards were added to the Security Index and 23 cards were cancelled, a net increase of 75 cards.

The Security Index count as of today is 26,228.

ACTION:

None. This is for your information.



STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: November 12, 1954

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX  
Bufile

The following is a report of the increase in the Security Index since the last count was furnished to you on October 8, 1954.

<u>Week of</u>	<u>New Cards Added</u>	<u>Cards Cancelled</u>	<u>Net Increase</u>
October 9-15	81	18	63
October 16-22	57	9	48
October 23-29	70	25	45
Oct. 30-Nov. 3	36	21	15
November 4-10	57	12	45
	<u>301</u>	<u>85</u>	<u>216</u>

For your information, during the preceding four-week period 242 cards were added and 76 cards were cancelled, a net increase of 166 cards.

The Security Index count as of today is 26,153.

ACTION:

This is for your information.

RECEIVED  
NOV 15 1954

UNRECORDED  
11-16-54

RA

(M) KEY FACILITIES LIST - PLANT INFORMANTS -- SECURITY INDEX - AD-  
JUSTMENT TO KEY FACILITIES LIST -- Refer to SAC Letter 54-42 which  
furnished all continental offices with appropriate state sections of  
the Eighth Edition of the Department of Defense Master Geographical

11/16/54

SAC LETTER NO. 54-65

11-16-54

Key Facilities List designated as KFL (H). Refer also to Paragraph M of SAC Letter 53-12 contained instructions as to the handling of the KFL in your office and to Paragraph N of the same SAC Letter containing instructions as to the adjustments to be made in the Security Index necessitated by changes in the KFL.

The Department of Defense has now prepared Change No. 1 dated November 1, 1954, to the KFL (H). Each line in which a change has occurred has been appropriately marked; however, many of the changes will have no effect upon the operations of the Bureau.

Each change in the KFL (H) has been marked with the symbol "H1" in the column headed "CH NO" and the bottoms of such pages are marked "Change No. 1." If only one side of a page has been affected by changes, that side of the page will be marked "Change No. 1" and the other side will be marked "Original." The letter "H" appearing in the column headed "CH NO" indicates a change made in the KFL (G) which was corrected when KFL (H) was issued. In other words, the only items in the attached Change No. 1 which change or alter the information in the KFL (H), now in your possession, are marked with the symbol "H1."

Any changes in the enclosed Change No. 1 to KFL (H) affecting the Plant Informant Program in your office must be handled in accordance with Paragraph M of SAC Letter 53-12.

Any changes in Change No. 1 which will affect the data appearing on Security Index cards of subjects employed in key facilities must be carefully checked through your Security Index and corrected Forms FD-122 submitted to the Bureau in accordance with Paragraph N of SAC Letter 53-12.

In order that all continental offices will have up-to-date data pertaining to the KFL (H), all such offices are being furnished with this SAC Letter a copy of the "Letter of Promulgation to Holders of the Department of Defense Key Facilities List" dated November 1, 1954, which refers to Change No. 1. All continental offices, with the exception of the Albuquerque, Butte, Charlotte, Denver, Little Rock, Miami, Norfolk, Oklahoma City, Phoenix, Portland, Richmond, Salt Lake City, and Washington Field Offices, are being furnished with this SAC Letter Change No. 1 to appropriate state sections. No changes have been received affecting the facilities within the territories of the thirteen offices named.

11/16/54  
SAC LETTER NO. 54-65

UNRECORDED

11-16-54

The pages in the KFL (H) which have been replaced by  
Change No. 1 should be destroyed when they are no longer needed  
to assist you in making the necessary corrections and adjustments  
in connection with the Plant Informant and Security Index Programs.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

11/16/54  
SAC LETTER NO. 54-65

3



STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memo.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: 11/19/54

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX CARD STATISTICS

There are attached two copies of a table showing by Field Office the total number of Security Index cards in our files. This table indicates the nationalistic tendency, the dangerousness classification, sex, race, citizenship, and others on one of the "Special Lists." A key to the abbreviations is also included.

These statistics are based on Statistical Section records as of November 15, 1954.

Attachments



KEY TO ABBREVIATIONS USED IN SECURITY INDEX

AL Alien  
CS Comsab  
DC Detcom  
KF Key Figure

NA Naturalized  
NB Native Born  
TF Top Functionary  
UN Unknown

AEP Atomic Energy Program Employees  
BUL Bulgarian  
COM Communist Party, USA  
ESP Espionage Subjects

FGE Foreign Government Employees  
GOV United States Government Employees  
HUN Hungarian  
ISL Independent Socialist League

JFG Johnson Forest Group  
MCI Muslim Cult of Islam  
MIS Miscellaneous  
NPR Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico

PPA Proletarian Party of America  
RUC Russian  
SUA Socialist Union of America  
SWP Socialist Workers' Party

UNE United Nations Employees  
UPR Union of the People for the Establishment  
of the Republic of Puerto Rico  
YUG Yugoslavian

Enc 1



## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: November 19,  
1954

FROM :

SUBJECT:

SECURITY INDEX -  
PROMINENT PERSONS CATEGORY

You will recall that the Department has been reviewing, at our request, the files of certain individuals listed as prominent to determine whether they should be placed in the Security Index.

On the afternoon of November 19, 1954, Assistant Attorney General advised Mr. and I that the Department is endeavoring to complete the review of these cases by January. had on his desk the Department's review on and . He said that these two cases were on the borderline and he was having difficulty making up his mind. He wondered whether it would serve any purpose to conduct interviews with such persons as and

I advised Mr. that the Department has all of the investigative reports concerning these prominent individuals and that the investigation sets forth completely their activities, both pro and con. I told that unless there is some unsettled issue which can be resolved through interview, there would appear to be no purpose in interviewing these individuals, particularly as had furnished a statement to the Bureau and had appeared before the HCUA and stated his position.

Mr. stated that in cases of doubt he was leaning toward placing these individuals on the Security Index. We made no comment but made it clear that the decision was up to the Department.

Well handled. Our investigation  
must make the decision.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: 11/26/54

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

During the past week 24 cards were added to the Security Index and 10 cards were cancelled, a net increase of 14 cards.

The Security Index count as of today is 26,242.

ACTION:

None. This is for your information.



UNRECORDED  
11-23-54

(M) SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS - PERIODIC SUBMISSION OF REPORTS -- In certain security investigations supplemental reports are required at designated intervals and during the interim between reports if no specific investigative leads are outstanding the cases are carried in a pending-inactive status. A question has been raised by a field office as to whether security cases requiring periodic reports should be reactivated 45 days prior to or at the end of designated periods.

In order that all such pending-inactive cases will be re-activated for the preparation of the periodic reports in a uniform manner you should adhere to the following procedures. Forty-five days prior to the date each periodic report is due the pending-inactive case should be made pending active for the preparation of the report in order that the report can be submitted to the Bureau at the designated time.

Appropriate Manual changes are being prepared in accordance with the above instruction in connection with the preparation of quarterly reports on Top Functionaries and semiannual reports on Key Figures and Security Index subjects employed in Key Facilities.

Of course, security cases in which periodic reports are required can be reactivated at any time if you determine important developments in the cases warrant such action either to advise the Bureau of the developments or to prepare investigative reports for dissemination purposes.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

11/23/54  
SAC LETTER NO. 54-66

*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: 11/18/54

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX LIST

The Security Index list as of 11/15/54 has been prepared. One copy is attached herewith for transmittal to the SAC, Quantico for retention in his personal custody with the other vital records maintained at the FBI Academy.

RECOMMENDATION:

That this memorandum and attached list be forwarded to the SAC, Quantico, who should take the following action: (1) Place the attached current list with the other vital records maintained at Quantico; - (2) Personally destroy by burning the old Security Index list presently in his possession and (3) note hereon that the action specified in items (1) and (2), above, has been taken.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: November 30, 1954

FROM

SUBJECT: SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS -  
SURVEY OF PENDING ACTIVE INVESTIGATIONS  
CONSIDERING SUBJECTS FOR THE SECURITY INDEX

By letter of October 25, 1954, addressed to Albany and all offices we requested the field to submit the number of pending active cases in the security classifications, and as of October 31, 1954, in which investigation remained to be conducted prior to bringing the cases to a status where a final determination could be made as to whether or not the subject's name should be recommended for the Security Index. The purpose of this letter was to place emphasis upon the prompt handling of all non-Security Index cases pending in the field.

The results have been received from all offices and an analysis reveals that there were 6,066 cases falling into the above category-i.e. non-Security Index cases which were in a pending active status as of October 31, 1954. The figure of 6,066 represents approximately 27 per cent of the total of 22,452 pending active matters in the security classifications throughout the field, both Security Index and non-Security Index cases. It appears desirable to re-emphasize the absolute necessity of affording close attention to the non-Security Index cases open in the field in order that they may be handled without delay and proper subjects recommended for inclusion in the Security Index:

RECOMMENDATION:

If you approve, there is attached a letter to Atlanta and 27 other offices whose figures were in excess of the field average of 27 per cent, noted above, instructing them to process their non-Security Index cases promptly in line with the foregoing observations. The attached letter is on plastiplat and the letter may be obtained for initialing by calling Extension 2355.





SAC, Atlanta

December 1, 1954

Director, FBI

PERSONAL ATTENTION

SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS -  
SURVEY OF PENDING ACTIVE INVESTIGATIONS  
CONSIDERING SUBJECTS FOR THE SECURITY INDEX

ReBulet to Albany October 25, 1954, instructing all offices to submit the total number of pending-active cases as of October 31, 1954, in which investigation remained to be conducted prior to bringing the cases to a status where a final determination might be made whether or not the subject's name should be included in the Security Index.

An analysis of the replies to referenced Bulet revealed that 6,066 cases in a pending-active status in the field as of October 31, 1954, fell into the above category, approximately 27 per cent of the total of 22,452 pending-active matters in the security classifications. This communication is directed to those offices whose figures as submitted were above the field average of 27 per cent of the total pending-active case load figures. It is indicated that added emphasis must be placed on your non-Security Index cases to process them expeditiously.

As you know, one of our principal responsibilities in the internal security field is the designation of individuals for inclusion in the Security Index when their subversive activities, affiliations or tendencies give indication that they would be potentially dangerous in the event of a national emergency. For that reason, concerted effort should be made in your offices to give preferred attention to non-Security Index cases to submit reports and place proper subjects in the Security Index with a minimum of delay. This requires close and diligent supervision on a continuing basis.

It is understood that in some areas penetration of the Communist Party underground has resulted in the development of additional cases for investigation. For example, in one Division the case load of non-Security Index subjects has shown marked increase in the wake of intensive coverage of underground matters. Lists of persons engaged in current Communist Party activity have in some instances been obtained through confidential informants and techniques resulting in temporary congestion in processing these cases. The New York Division, wherein the "hard core" of the Communist Party is centralized, continues to develop new security cases through informant coverage and other investigative operations.

The Bureau is taking the opportunity to focus attention upon this problem and to reiterate the absolute necessity of affording close supervision to your pending-active, non-Security Index cases. This matter should be discussed in detail with appropriate supervisory personnel in your offices and the foregoing comments impressed upon Special Agents engaged in all phases of security work.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: 12/3/54

TO :

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

During the past week 74 cards were added to the Security Index and 13 cards were cancelled, a net increase of 61 cards.

The Security Index count as of today is 26,303.

ACTION:

None. This is for your information.



Office Memorandum

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: 12-6-54

FROM :

MA

SUBJECT: INTERNAL SECURITY DIVISION  
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE  
STATE OF OHIO

cc

SAC [redacted] called from Cincinnati at 11:00 AM, December 5, 1954. He advised that [redacted] of the Internal Security Section, Attorney General's Office, State of Ohio, had been in to see him and had furnished the names of nine individuals who will be subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury on Wednesday morning, December 8, 1954. [redacted] stated that it is not anticipated that any individual indictments will result from this grand jury action, but that they will merely make a presentation in the form of a general report. [redacted] stated that all of the individuals being subpoenaed from the Cincinnati area are Security Index subjects and none of them are informants. He, therefore, is advising [redacted] that in so far as these individuals, he has no comment to make regarding the issuance of subpoenas as to those individuals. He is advising the Bureau by teletype of the identities of the persons subpoenaed and is advising Cleveland and Louisville by teletype since individuals from those districts are also included in the subpoenas. He will ask the Cleveland and Louisville Offices to advise as to whether the individuals in their territories are confidential informants and as to whether the issuance of subpoenas would in any way interfere with the work of the Bureau.

ACTION

Upon receipt of information from Cleveland and Louisville, if it is indicated that the persons being subpoenaed are informants, we will analyze and make appropriate recommendation.



STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: 12/8/54

TO :

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX  
COMSAB TABBING

SYNOPSIS:

Although all Security Index subjects will be apprehended as rapidly as possible in an emergency in view of the size of the Index the priority of apprehension program provides that arrest efforts will be directed at the more dangerous persons first. The priority subjects are indicated by the Detcom and Comsab classifications. The Comsab classification indicates the subject possesses the potential to be a saboteur because of certain specific training or employment in key or vital industries. Other exceedingly dangerous persons are tabbed Detcom. The number of persons to be afforded priority of apprehension has steadily increased as the Security Index increased and as of November 15, 1954, of 26,174 Security Index cards 11,033 were tabbed for priority of apprehension. Present instructions require that a Special Agent be assigned to the arrest of each priority subject.

The number of priority arrests has increased to the point where the priority program will lose its effectiveness. In certain of the larger offices it will be necessary to assign three or more priority subjects to each Special Agent available for arrests. The Chicago Office has recommended that authority be granted to permit arrests of priority subjects by a police detective and a police officer. It is recommended that this not be done but that the basis for tabbing Security Index cards Comsab be changed to provide that such tabbing not be made due to military service alone as has been done in the past but rather that each case be considered separately to determine if information has been developed concerning specific previous training or violent tendencies indicating the subject possesses the potential to be a saboteur.



It is estimated that the above change will reduce the number of priority subjects by over 50 per cent. This will provide a more selective basis for such tabbings and will permit a more efficient handling of the arrests. Review of such cases by the field will be done on a staggered basis, the entire project to be completed by all offices by June 15, 1955.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

- 1) It is recommended that there be no change in the instruction that a Special Agent be assigned to each arrest of a Security Index subject tabbed for priority of apprehension.
- 2) If you approve, there is attached an SAC Letter instructing the field to no longer consider military service alone as the basis for Comsab tabbing but that any subject should be considered for Comsab when an investigation develops information concerning specific previous training or violent tendencies indicating the subject possesses the potential to be a saboteur.
- 3) Manual changes attached. NO HANDBOOK CHANGE NECESSARY.

OK  
H

DETAILS:

Due to the large number of Security Index arrests to be made in an emergency we have a priority of apprehension program set up so that efforts to arrest will be directed against the more dangerous persons first. The priority classifications are identified as Comsab and Detcom.

The Comsab classification has been set up for the purpose of providing ready identification of those Security Index subjects who, because of special training, employment in or access to key facilities or certain other factors, possess the potential of saboteurs in the event of an emergency. Specifically, the Comsab classification includes Security Index subjects who are:  
(1) Employed in key facilities; (2) Veterans of military services of any country and particularly the Abraham Lincoln Brigade;  
(3) Veterans of O.S.S. (Office of Strategic Services); (4) Graduates of the Lenin School in Russia and (5) Known to have engaged in acts of violence during industrial strikes and those who have engaged in fomenting trouble among laborers in industrial plants.

The Detcom classification includes all Security Index subjects who are considered exceedingly dangerous and should be apprehended prior to others in the Security Index. Specifically, it includes the following: (1) All Top Functionaries (subversive leaders on a national scale); (2) All Key Figures (subversive leaders on a local scale); (3) All individuals included under the Comsab classification and (4) any other individual in the Security Index who, although he does not fall in the above groups, should be afforded prior arrest because of certain elements developed in the investigation reflecting him to be exceedingly dangerous.

Problem

The Security Index has been steadily increasing and there has been a corresponding increase in the number of Security Index subjects whose cards are tabbed for priority of apprehension. Out of 26,174 cards in our Security Index on November 15, 1954, the date of our last statistical report, 11,033 were so tabbed. The number of subjects listed for priority attention has grown to the point where the priority apprehension program may lose its



effectiveness. This is particularly true in view of the fact that present instructions require that a Special Agent be assigned to the apprehension of each Security Index subject tabbed for priority of arrest.

Observation:

The larger offices are principally affected in this matter, for although they may use police officers alone without Special Agents being present to apprehend Security Index subjects not scheduled for priority attention, a Special Agent must be assigned in the latter type of arrest. The Chicago Office has raised a question in this matter and has suggested that authorization be granted to permit a police detective and police officer to be assigned to arrests of subjects listed for priority attention. This recommendation was made because that office plans to use approximately 195 arrest teams consisting of a Special Agent and a police officer to effect the arrests of approximately 691 subjects tabbed for priority of apprehension. This means three to four such subjects to each arrest team. There are other offices in which it would be necessary to assign as many or more priority of arrest subjects to each Special Agent available for arrest assignment.

It is believed that priority of arrest subjects should continue to be assigned to arrest teams in which a Special Agent will be present because those subjects are the more dangerous and we must be certain that every effort is made to effect their arrests as rapidly as possible rather than permit police officers alone to apprehend such subjects. It is believed we should reconsider the elements upon which the priority tabbings are based.

Evaluation:

All of the reasons for the Comsab and Detcom tabbings are based on an individual's violent tendencies, subversive leadership or special subversive training except the Comsab tabbing because of employment or access to key or vital facilities and the veterans of the military services of any country.

It is definitely believed that the Comsab classification should be attached to any individual connected with a vital or key facility even though there is no known background of violent



tendencies, et cetera. The fact that the subject has access to such facilities is sufficient to warrant his prompt apprehension.

Individuals who have been tabbed for Comsab because of military service alone with no other element for the tabbing present a different situation. This group represents a large portion of the 11,033 persons now considered for priority of arrest. Although the exact number is not known it is estimated that the number so tabbed on military service alone will run over 50 per cent of the total. Although military training in most instances indicates training in the use of firearms other individuals who have had experience with firearms such as hunters, et cetera, are not considered exceedingly dangerous based on that experience alone. Of course, if an investigation has developed information concerning specific previous training or violent tendencies indicating the subject possesses the potential to be a saboteur the subject should be considered under the priority program. It is believed that each case should be considered separately on the facts developed rather than to arbitrarily list a subject for priority arrest just because he is known to have been in the Armed Services.

The recommended change in procedures to reduce the number of Security Index subjects to be afforded priority of arrest will not weaken our program. It will permit prompt and more effective efforts by Special Agent personnel to arrest the more dangerous persons due to the reduction in the number of priority arrest assignments.

The attached SAC Letter instructs field offices with a relatively small number of COMSAB subjects to review the files at this time and submit a Form Fd-122 to change tabbing when necessary. Larger offices may review the files at the time of the next verification of addresses and employment. All reviews are to be completed by June 15, 1955

Office Memorandum

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

UNRECORDED

DATE: 12-21-54

TO :

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

On the morning of December 21, 1954, I spoke to Mr. [redacted] of the Department to inquire whether the Department had replied to our letter wherein we asked what criteria the Department was using in evaluating Security Index cases reviewed by the Department. Mr. [redacted] said that Mr. [redacted] had not yet returned to work and, therefore, a reply had not yet been sent. However, [redacted] said that the Department has been utilizing the same criteria as those used by the FBI and that these criteria were used by the Department in reviewing the more than 3,000 Security Index cases which the Department has reviewed in the past. Mr. [redacted] said that the Department's letter of October 8, 1952 and a subsequent letter in November, 1952, approving our standards, were meant to advise the Bureau not only of the approval of our standards, but that the Department was utilizing these standards also. [redacted] said that in looking over these letters he notes that the wording is not clear.

Copies of these letters are attached for your information and you will note that the wording in the letter of October 8, 1952 states "after careful study of the application of the standards which have been used by the Bureau in the listing of names on the Security Index list, it is my opinion that these standards can be utilized by your Bureau and by the Criminal Division in meeting the responsibilities of each under the Apprehension and Detention Program." The letter of November 25, 1952, states "pursuant to the questions which you have raised in the latter memorandum (our memorandum of October 15, 1952, which requested assurance that the Department intended to proceed in an emergency under the Program as outlined in the Department's portfolio and that the standards to be used were those we were then using) I wish to assure you that it is the Department's intention in the event of emergency to proceed under the Program as outlined in the Department's portfolio invoking the standards now used."

[redacted] said that he will see that a reply comes to us in next day or so in response to our recent letter and that the Department's reply to our letter will be clear in this respect.

**ACTION:** Following the receipt of the Departmental reply to our letter we will confer with the Department as to their thinking and applying these criteria, utilizing as a basis the [redacted] case.

*I do wish our people would call this phoney phrase*

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE  
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

EMPLOYEE SUGGESTION # 11 92-54

Date December 7, 1954

To: Director, FBI

From: \_\_\_\_\_

Field Office or Division Pittsburgh Office

SUGGESTION: RE SECURITY INDEX (Fingerprint Classification)

During an investigation of a security subject, an FD-9 requesting an Identification Record check is submitted to the Bureau by the office of origin. The subject is recommended for inclusion on the Security Index and the Security Index card is forwarded to the field from the Bureau. An Identification Record is also forwarded to the field from the Identification Division in reply to the FD-9. A form FD-165 is then submitted to the Bureau from the field requesting that a Security Flash Notice be placed in the subject's Identification Record. After this is done the Identification Division forwards a letter to the field office advising of the subject's FBI number and fingerprint classification. SUGGESTION: That the fingerprint classification be requested on the FD-9 and included on the Identification Record which is returned to the field by the Identification Division.

The last communication from the Bureau would be eliminated completely since its only purpose is to advise the field of the FBI number and fingerprint classification. This would result in a great saving in personnel time and material expense both in the Identification Division and the field office since it would eliminate the processing of the communication in both places.

It should save at least \$ \_\_\_\_\_ annually.

The use by the United States of my suggestion shall not form the basis of a further claim of any nature by me, my heirs, or assigns upon the United States.

Comments and recommendation of Supervisor, SAC, or Assistant Director:

This appears to be a worthwhile suggestion and will result in an unestimated saving of time. I recommend its adoption.



12-7-54

(I) ESPIONAGE AND FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS; DOUBLE AGENT PROGRAM; FULL EXPLOITATION OF ALL KNOWN CONTACTS OF SOVIET/SATELLITE PERSONNEL AND ESTABLISHMENTS -- SAC Letter 54-26(U) states: "If no reason to the contrary exists, the contact (of Soviet or satellite personnel or establishments may, with Bureau approval, be interviewed to determine his reason for making the contact and to determine if he should be placed on the Security Index or if advisable to explore the possibility of securing his cooperation as an informant or double agent."

A memorandum shall be submitted requesting Bureau authority for such an interview. In each instance the memorandum must contain the following information, if available:

- I. Residence address, occupation, employment, date and place of birth and citizenship status of the subject.
- II. Marital status.  
If married, the occupation and employment of the spouse.
- III. Circumstances regarding the contact or contacts with Soviet or satellite establishments or personnel.
- IV. Past and present subversive activities or connections of the subject.
- V. Past or present subversive activities or connections of subject's spouse or relatives.
- VI. Informant or double-agent potentialities.
- VII. Any other factor which might have bearing on desirability or undesirability of interview.
- VIII. What is expected to be gained by the interview?

In each memorandum pertinent information, if available, regarding the eight items listed above must be set out under the appropriate number, but the above headings need not be restated. If no pertinent data is available regarding any of the items, you should make the appropriate comments after the respective number.

In addition to furnishing the itemized information relating to the above-listed items, unless you are recommending a special manner of procedure for conducting the interview, the last paragraph of each memorandum should contain the following statements: "Bureau authority is requested to interview subject in accordance with existing instructions relating to interviews of security subjects. Care will be exercised to protect the original source in this matter. If this subject is cooperative, no affirmative steps will be taken during the initial interview to direct his activities, but a separate communication will be directed to the Bureau setting forth the results of the interview and requesting authority to re-contact the subject as a potential security informant or double agent."

Upon receipt of a request for interview the Bureau will advise whether or not authorization to conduct the interview is granted. In those instances when it is not necessary for the Bureau to issue specific instructions or comments in connection with authorizing an interview, the Bureau will approve requests to interview contacts of Soviet or satellite establishments or personnel by placing an appropriate rubber stamp impression on a carbon copy of the request which will be returned to the field by routing slip.

SAC Letter #54-65  
12-7-54

Section L-Pull

O SECURITY INDEX - General

(L) RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE FBI IN THE INTERNAL SECURITY FIELD --  
Your attention is directed to SAC Letter No. 54-65 dated November 16, 1954, in which you were advised that the Responsibilities Program has been reinstated. In order that the Bureau may more closely supervise this Program and evaluate its effectiveness, you are instructed to submit a letter to the Bureau by December 27, 1954, setting forth the following information:

- (1) The name of each individual concerning whom you have disseminated information under this Program.
- (2) The date on which dissemination was authorized by the Bureau.
- (3) The identity of the individual to whom the information was furnished.
- (4) The date dissemination was made.
- (5) The position or the employment of the subject of the dissemination at the time dissemination was made.
- (6) The present employment of the subject and date of verification.

Following your initial letter to be submitted by December 27, 1954, you are instructed thereafter by March 15, June 15, September 15, and December 15 of each year to advise the Bureau of the above-listed information concerning each individual whose name appears on the initial list who:

(1) continues to be employed in the position which he held at the time dissemination was made on him under the Responsibilities Program, or

(2) has changed his employment to another position which comes within the scope of the Program.

Each succeeding letter submitted by you should also include the names and the desired information regarding each individual on whom you disseminated information under this Program subsequent to the submission of each preceding letter.

It will not be necessary to list the names of those individuals included in your initial letter whose listed employment as reflected in the initial letter was outside the scope of the Responsibilities Program.

The names of all persons included in the initial letter who were at that time employed within the scope of the Responsibilities Program and all names that are added to subsequent letters must continue to be included in all succeeding letters to and including the letter reflecting that the person is employed in a position outside the scope of the Responsibilities Program.

The fact that a person's name is removed from the Security Index will have no effect on whether you should continue to include his name in your letters to the Bureau.

It is not desired that any specific inquiry be made by you of any state official or local official of a municipal government to determine what action, if any, has been taken upon the information which has been disseminated by the FBI under the Responsibilities Program.

In every instance where information has been submitted to state officials concerning a Security Index subject and that subject is subsequently determined to have established himself in another state, the old office of origin will advise the Bureau and the new office of origin by letter under the Responsibilities caption that information was furnished to state officials regarding the subject. The new office of origin, if the subject obtains employment which brings him within the purview of the Responsibilities Program, should take the necessary steps to bring to the Governor's attention information regarding the subject.

The new office of origin should remain alert in order that at any time in the future the subject obtains employment within the scope of the Responsibilities Program consideration can be given to disseminating information concerning subject to the Governor of the state.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

, I. R. -8

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : THE DIRECTOR

DATE: 12/10/54

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX  
Bufile

The following is a report of the increase in the Security Index since the last count was furnished to you on November 12, 1954.

<u>Week of</u>	<u>New Cards Added</u>	<u>Cards Cancelled</u>	<u>Net Increase</u>
November 13-19	98	23	75
November 20-26	24	10	14
November 27 - Dec. 3	74	13	61
December 4 -10	47	13	34
	<u>243</u>	<u>59</u>	<u>184</u>

For your information, during the preceding four-week period 251 cards were added and 67 cards were cancelled, a net increase of 184 cards.

The Security Index count as of today is 26,337. //

ACTION:

This is for your information.





STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: December 10, 1954

TO :

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

The Director noted in his memorandum of December 8, 1954, that during his conversation with the Attorney General on December 7, 1954, the Attorney General was informed that a representative of the Bureau would confer with the Internal Security Division of the Department to discuss the criteria employed by each of the divisions in reaching a decision as to the inclusion or exclusion of a name on the FBI's Security Index.

It is noted that by memorandum dated December 8, 1954, to Assistant Attorney General [redacted], we asked what criteria were being utilized by the Department in passing on these cases. It was our thought to await a reply from [redacted] prior to orally discussing this with the Department. I will, of course, take the matter up personally with [redacted] orally immediately if this is desired; otherwise, we will await the Department's reply before going into any oral discussion.



## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: 12/13/54

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

On the afternoon of December 13, 1954, Mr. [redacted] and I talked to Assistant Attorney General [redacted] of the Department concerning the criteria being used by the Department in reviewing Security Index cases. I pointed out to Mr. [redacted] that we had sent a letter dated December 8, 1954, to the Department asking the Department to advise us in this respect. Mr. [redacted] advised that the Department is in the process of replying to that letter.

At Mr. [redacted] request, I briefly reviewed the history of the discussions between the Bureau and the Department on the criteria to be used to place persons on the Security Index. I pointed out that at the time the Department agreed to review the Security Index cases, a number of conferences were held between Bureau and Department representatives on the question of criteria. Mr. [redacted] and Mr. [redacted] of the Department attempted to set up a separate set of criteria from those which the Bureau was utilizing. Their thought apparently was to try to bring the criteria within the detention provisions of the Internal Security Act of 1950. The Department did not find this to be workable and the matter ended up by the Department approving the criteria utilized by the Bureau for the Bureau's use in placing persons on the Security Index. However, the Department has never, to my knowledge, furnished the Bureau with the actual criteria utilized by the Department. I pointed out that the Department had reviewed over 3,000 cases and had agreed in each instance to the inclusion of the subject in the Index.

Mr. [redacted] stated that his recollection was the same as mine, although he recalled that after Assistant Attorney General [redacted] took over, the Department ended up by utilizing the Bureau's criteria in reviewing the Security Index cases. I told him that the Department had never advised us of this fact if it were so.

Mr. said that to his knowledge the Department had not disagreed with the Bureau except in very few instances. I told him that in only one instance had the Department suggested the removal of a Security Index subject, namely in the case of . In addition, the Department ruled that should not be placed on the Security Index.

I pointed out that because of the very serious nature of the Security Index program it appears essential that we be advised of the criteria being used by the Department and if the same criteria are being utilized as set forth by the Bureau, it appears very necessary that we know fully the Department's thinking in applying these criteria.

ACTION:

The Department will reply to our letter as soon as possible. Mr. who is handling this in the Department is on leave this week.

If the Department is using the same criteria as the FBI, we will discuss the thinking applied by the Department to the case. We will not discuss the case unless you so desire as was not on the Security Index. However, we will utilize the conversation in the case to go over the various criteria to be sure we understand the Department's thinking.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

1801

**Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

TO :

DATE: December 13,  
1954

FROM :

SUBJECT: DELINQUENCY IN SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS

SYNOPSIS:

Each month we follow the field closely on the status of security work by analyzing the backlog of pending cases and delinquency in Espionage, Internal Security, Security Matter and foreign intelligence cases in classifications 65, 100 and 105. Status of these cases as of November 30, 1954, is set forth herein.

Pending active matters in the entire field in the security classifications increased from 22,452 to 23,179. Delinquent matters increased from 6,413 to 6,918, with the resultant over-all statistical increase from 28.5 per cent to 29.4 per cent. The delinquency in security cases in the New York Office decreased from 1,639 to 1,577, a delinquency of 29.3 per cent. The number of pending active matters in the 100 classification increased in the New York Office from 3,977 to 4,027 and the delinquent items in this classification decreased from 1,373 to 1,323 or statistical delinquency of 32.9 per cent. It is noted that the 29.3 per cent of delinquency in the security classifications of the New York Office is the lowest percentage of delinquency in these classifications since the Bureau has, on a regular basis, been following the field in this matter.

OBSERVATIONS:

Despite the continued progress of the New York Office in reducing their security delinquency, the over-all trend during November was upward in pending matters (see page two) pending active matters, and delinquent items in the security classifications, as noted above. Each of these items decreased during the previous month, October, 1954.

To prevent a continuation of this trend, we have sent letters to 20 offices with excessive delinquency, directed to the personal attention of the SAC's, instructing them to bring their security cases to current status.

Enfile.

RECOMMENDATION:

The field will continue to be followed closely in this matter and you will be advised of the results of the review of the December, 1954, administrative reports.

DETAILS:

Since December, 1951, we have been following, on a monthly basis, the twelve field offices having a large proportion of our pending security work and since March, 1952, all offices. We have written letters to the twelve offices and to other offices where progress in reducing the backlog of work and delinquency has not been satisfactory.

The November, 1954, administrative reports from all offices reflect that the total pending active matters in the classifications 65, 100 and 105 increased during this month from 22,452 to 23,179. The delinquent items increased from 6,413 to 6,918, which represents a statistical increase of from 28.5 per cent to 29.4 per cent.

The following statistics reflect the status of pending work including both pending active and pending inactive matters and delinquency for all field divisions as of December 31, 1951, and the progress for the last four months:

TOTAL PENDING MATTERS  
CLASSIFICATIONS 65, 100 and 105  
ALL FIELD DIVISIONS

<u>Classification</u>	<u>12-31-51</u>	<u>8-31-54</u>	<u>9-30-54</u>	<u>10-31-54</u>	<u>11-30-54</u>
65	1,314	1,056	1,060	1,066	1,035
100	32,812	21,484	21,807	21,911	22,419
105	2,895	3,760	3,588	3,428	3,493
Total	37,021	26,300	26,455	26,405	26,947

TOTAL DELINQUENT MATTERS  
CLASSIFICATIONS 65, 100 and 105  
ALL FIELD DIVISIONS

<u>Classification</u>	<u>12-31-51</u>	<u>8-31-54</u>	<u>9-30-54</u>	<u>10-31-54</u>	<u>11-30-54</u>
65	525	184	172	163	170
100	22,518	5,928	5,758	5,580	6,018
105	1,719	898	790	670	730
Total	24,762	7,010	6,720	6,413	6,918

The following statistics reflect the total of pending active matters, delinquency and percentage of delinquency of all offices since January 31, 1953.

CLASSIFICATIONS 65, 100 and 105  
ALL FIELD DIVISIONS

<u>Date</u>	<u>Pending Active Matters</u>	<u>Delinquent Matters</u>	<u>Percentage Delinquent</u>
1-31-53	24,098	11,772	48.8%
2-28-53	22,935	11,233	46.9%
3-31-53	23,033	10,890	47.3%
4-30-53	22,100	9,120	41.3%
5-31-53	21,740	9,730	44.8%
6-30-53	20,970	9,558	45.6%
7-31-53	20,180	9,411	46.6%
8-31-53	19,493	8,495	43.0%
9-30-53	19,224	7,571	39.4%
10-31-53	19,141	5,580	34.3%
11-30-53	19,833	6,655	33.5%
12-31-53	19,947	6,749	33.2%
1-31-54	20,520	7,494	36.5%
2-28-54	21,488	6,007	27.9%
3-31-54	21,848	6,617	30.2%
4-30-54	21,752	6,757	31.6%
5-31-54	21,863	7,822	35.8%
6-30-54	22,278	7,407	33.2%
7-31-54	22,977	7,163	31.6%
8-31-54	22,361	7,010	31.3%
9-30-54	23,011	6,720	29.1%
10-31-54	22,452	6,413	28.5%
11-30-54	23,179	6,918	29.7%

Status of Security Work in Twelve of the  
Larger Offices

The following statistics reflect the progress of the twelve larger offices we have been closely following since December, 1951. These offices have approximately 81 per cent of the total Security Index cards and a high percentage of the pending work and delinquency in classifications 65, 100 and 105.

STATISTICS FOR TWELVE OFFICES  
SECURITY INDEX COUNT AND FOR  
65, 100 and 105 MATTERS

Office	Security Index Cards	Pending Active Matters		Percentage Delinquent	
	11-15-54	10-31-54	11-30-54	10-31-54	11-30-54
* New York	6,908	5,301	5,349	30.9%	29.9%
* Los Angeles	4,141	1,973	2,167	39%	34%
* San Francisco	2,330	1,611	1,886	39%	30%
* Chicago	1,540	1,389	1,454	30%	50%
Detroit	1,354	917	943	25%	20%
Philadelphia	1,200	992	999	25%	22%
* Newark	891	1,179	1,140	28%	37%
* Cleveland	685	464	489	33%	28%
* Seattle	671	358	394	25%	25%
* Boston	674	602	722	25%	20%
* New Haven	539	624	589	26%	46%
Minneapolis	524	248	280	21%	21%
	21,457	15,858	16,412		

\* Letters being sent to offices indicated. See page 8 herein.

The over-all statistics for the eleven offices other than the New York Office since August 31, 1952, are as follows:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Pending Active Matters(65-100-105)</u>	<u>Delinquent Matters (65-100-105)</u>	<u>Percentage Delinquent(65-100-105)</u>
8-31-52	12,611	7,589	60.2%
9-30-52	11,367	5,732	50.4%
10-31-52	11,286	4,957	43.9%
11-30-52	11,148	4,844	43.5%
12-31-52	10,937	4,578	41.9%
1-31-53	10,730	4,696	43.8%
2-28-53	10,721	4,358	40.6%
3-31-53	10,069	4,019	39.9%
4-30-53	9,411	2,887	30.7%
5-31-53	9,277	3,447	37.2%
6-30-53	8,964	3,532	39.4%
7-31-53	8,908	3,758	42.2%
8-31-53	8,547	3,618	42.3%
9-30-53	8,601	3,249	37.8%
10-31-53	8,845	2,785	31.4%
11-30-53	9,434	2,871	30.4%
12-31-53	9,552	3,261	34.1%
1-31-54	9,814	3,318	33.6%
2-28-54	10,200	3,021	29.4%
3-31-54	10,188	2,998	29.4%
4-30-54	10,201	3,209	31.5%
5-31-54	9,840	3,920	39.8%
6-30-54	9,839	3,679	37.5%
7-31-54	10,317	3,348	32.4%
8-31-54	10,048	3,364	33.4%
9-30-54	10,669	3,488	32.7%
10-31-54	10,557	3,376	31.9%
11-31-54	11,063	3,822	34.5%

#### New York Office

During 1953, the New York Office made a steady reduction in delinquent matters in the security classifications as well as a steady reduction in the case backlog. During November, 1953, the security delinquency dropped below 50 per cent for the first time in 1953 to 47 per cent. This was reduced even further in December to 43 per cent as compared with January, 1953, delinquency of 76 per cent in the security classifications. In January, 1954, the New York delinquency rose to 53 per cent. It was reduced, however, in February, 1954, to 32 per cent and during the period March through September, 1954, averaged 38 per cent. In October, 1954, the New York security delinquency dropped



to 30.9 per cent, the lowest percentage of delinquency in the security classifications which had existed in the New York Office since this matter has been followed on a regular basis by the Bureau.

The November, 1954, administrative report of New York reveals still further progress. Its security delinquency decreased during the past month from 30.9 per cent to 29.3 per cent, a new low for that office. Although pending active security cases increased slightly in the New York Office from 5,301 for October, 1954, to 5,349 for November, 1954, delinquent items decreased from 1,639 as of October, 1954, to 1,571 as of November, 1954.

The New York Office has approximately 23 per cent of the pending active matters in the 65, 100 and 105 classifications in the entire field. This office also has approximately 23 per cent of the number of delinquent items in these classifications throughout the field. The average delinquency in all other offices at the end of November, 1954, was approximately 29.9 per cent. The New York delinquency was 29.3 per cent as previously noted.

The bulk of the New York backlog and delinquency is in the 100 classification. During November, 1954, the number of pending active matters in the 100 classification in the New York Office increased from 3,977 to 4,021. The number of delinquent matters in this classification decreased from 1,373 to 1,323 with a statistical decrease from 35 per cent for October, 1954, to 32.9 per cent as of November 30, 1954.

Status of Security Work in the Remaining Forty Offices

The remaining forty offices are listed according to the percentage of delinquency on November 30, 1954, in total matters in classifications 65, 100 and 105. These statistics reflect the progress during November, 1954. It should be noted that many of the smaller offices have no pending matters in classifications 65 and 105 and their entire pending backlog is in classification 100 matters.



Office	Active Matters		Percentage Delinquent	
	10-31-54	11-30-54	10-31-54	11-30-54
• Columbus	57	51	30%	41%
• Cincinnati	36	38	14%	37%
• Birmingham	379	360	24%	35%
• Cincinnati	245	220	10%	32%
• San Diego	670	690	29%	29%
• Baltimore	47	45	26%	29%
• Memphis	374	367	25%	29%
• Pittsburgh	100	93	17%	29%
• Springfield	293	340	20%	28%
• Albany	132	138	23%	28%
• New Orleans	60	60	13%	27%
• Omaha	52	53	11%	26%
• San Antonio	106	110	19%	25%
• Charlotte	265	289	13%	24%
• St. Louis	985	947	24%	24%
• Washington Field	198	195	17%	22%
• Miami	45	51	30%	22%
• Norfolk	67	59	28%	22%
• Salt Lake City	172	156	22%	22%
• San Juan	69	76	22%	21%
• Atlanta	54	62	21%	21%
• Houston	73	87	22%	21%
• Richmond	43	43	32%	20%
• El Paso	92	103	22%	20%
• Kansas City	36	40	8%	20%
• Knoxville	45	45	11%	20%
• Mobile	262	269	11%	20%
• Milwaukee	34	32	12%	19%
• Anchorage	159	168	23%	18%
• Indianapolis	53	51	11%	18%
• Oklahoma City	52	61	17%	16%
• Butte	30	37	7%	16%
• Little Rock	172	187	15%	15%
• Denver	24	34	4%	14%
• Honolulu	83	92	22%	12%
• Dallas	67	72	28%	12%
• Phoenix	103	77	33%	9%
• Albuquerque	690	824	22%	8%
• Buffalo	141	111	15%	8%
• Portland	29	34	7%	6%
• Savannah				

Letters sent to offices indicated regarding delinquent status.  
 See page 8 herein.

The following figures illustrate the progress of the forty offices as a whole since June 30, 1952, as reflected in the administrative reports.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Pending Active Matters (65-100-105)</u>	<u>Delinquent Matters (65-100-105)</u>	<u>Percentage Delinquent</u>
6-30-52	8,417	3,842	45.6%
7-31-52	7,778	3,156	40.6%
8-31-52	6,928	3,054	44.0%
9-30-52	6,198	2,109	34.0%
10-31-52	6,126	1,279	20.6%
11-30-52	6,129	1,703	27.8%
12-31-52	6,228	1,691	27.2%
1-31-53	6,080	1,554	25.6%
2-28-53	6,103	1,515	24.6%
3-31-53	5,936	1,542	26.0%
4-30-53	5,864	1,414	24.1%
5-31-53	4,897	1,726	29.3%
6-30-53	5,611	1,577	28.1%
7-31-53	5,146	1,358	26.4%
8-31-53	5,095	1,333	26.3%
9-30-53	5,050	1,219	24.1%
10-31-53	4,987	1,087	21.8%
11-30-53	5,180	1,355	26.1%
12-31-53	5,280	1,301	24.6%
1-31-54	5,562	1,444	25.9%
2-28-54	5,997	1,347	22.5%
3-31-54	6,079	1,431	23.5%
4-30-54	6,174	1,327	21.5%
5-31-54	6,733	1,710	25.4%
6-30-54	7,022	1,522	21.6%
7-31-54	6,910	1,590	23.0%
8-31-54	6,728	1,520	22.5%
9-30-54	6,710	1,410	21.0%
10-31-54	6,594	1,398	21.2%
11-30-54	6,767	1,519	22.4%

Letters to the Field

As noted previously, on page one herein, we are sending letters to 20 offices either instructing them to take appropriate measures to bring the investigations in the security classifications to, or maintain them in a current status. Letters are being directed to the offices indicated by asterisks on pages four and seven herein. It will be noted that the security delinquency of those offices for the month of November, 1954, appears in the extreme right hand column of the two lists on pages four and seven.

RECORDED  
12-13-54

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: 12-13-54

TO : THE DIRECTOR

FROM :

SUBJECT:

This is an interim memorandum to reflect the steps taken by me concerning the re-evaluation of the criteria currently being used to place a person on the Security Index to determine whether they are sound or should be modified in any respect.

I have reviewed the criteria currently being used and have received, in response to my request, observations from five SACs concerning these criteria. Preliminarily it can be indicated that the criteria appear to be sound and workable. Several minor observations have been made by the SACs which are presently being studied.

In addition, 95 files of individuals on the Security Index were reviewed (82 by me personally and 33 by Mr. ), for the purpose of determining whether I felt these persons were properly included in the Security Index. It is concluded that 90 of the subjects very clearly belong on the Security Index. I have selected five borderline type of cases for consultation with Messrs. and to determine the soundness of the reasoning employed by the Field in recommending, and the Bureau in approving, the placing of these persons on the Security Index. In two of these five borderline cases there was terminology employed which was inconclusive, indicating that either poor reporting technique was employed or incomplete investigation was conducted. In both of these instances the terminology employed makes it difficult to decide because of the inconclusive language, the point presented. These two situations are also being discussed with Messrs. and with the view to resolving the difficulties presented in these two cases. If satisfactory explanations are not apparent, the Field will be requested to submit explanations and appropriate recommendations will be made as to any administrative action needed.

The incompleting portions of this project are being expedited and a complete memorandum concerning this entire situation will be submitted at the earliest possible date.

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: 12/18/54

FROM :

SUBJECT: SUGGESTION #1092-54  
MADE BY  
PITTSBURGH OFFICE

SUGGESTION:

In connection with security investigations of individuals, the field submits Form FD-9 (Identification Record Check) to the Bureau in order to obtain the arrest record of the subject. Subsequently, the field recommends inclusion of the subject on the Security Index and when this action is approved submits the subject's name to the Identification Division. Thereafter the Identification Division advises the field of the subject's FBI number and fingerprint classification. Suggesting employee feels that the fingerprint classification and FBI number could be furnished earlier without the need of the Identification Division submitting a separate letter.

OBSERVATIONS:

On 8/16/54, the Executive Conference approved a suggestion by Mr. [redacted] that the fingerprint classifications and FBI numbers be added to the descriptive data on the Security Index cards presently maintained in the field offices. The Identification Division has been preparing since that time and has now completed sending out approximately 18,000 letters to the field which brings up to date this instruction. Now when a Form FD-9 (Identification Record Check) is received on a Security Subject, the Identification Division automatically furnishes the FBI number and fingerprint classification on the Identification Record.

CONCLUSIONS:

Inasmuch as this is the current practice, it appears no further action is needed, except to thank the suggesting employee.

RECOMMENDATION:

Attached letter be forwarded to [redacted] if approved.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: 12/17/54

TO :

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

During the past week 113 cards were added to the Security Index and 10 cards were cancelled, a net increase of 103 cards.

The Security Index count as of today is 26,440.

ACTION:

None. This is for your information.



UNRECORDED

December 13, 1954

THE ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL

DIRECTOR, FBI

~~REPRESENTATIVE OF THE AD HOC GROUP  
ON SPECIAL CASES UNDER  
OPERATIONS COORDINATING BOARD~~

Reference is made to your memorandum dated November 6, 1954, in which you suggest that the FBI should confer with Messrs. [redacted] and [redacted], who will represent the Department on the Ad Hoc Group on Special Case cases under the Operations Coordinating Board, regarding the security aspects of admission into the country of defectors, refugees and escapees. In accordance with your suggestion, FBI representatives will be available to confer with Messrs. [redacted] and [redacted] at any time regarding this problem through our regular liaison.

*Security Index - Cont.*

You also pointed out in your memorandum that in cases of the security risk involved there will undoubtedly be some cases where over-all Governmental policy might require the admission of such persons into the United States. You pointed out that even though the sponsoring agency accepts full responsibility for the entry of such a person into the United States, there will thereafter be a continuing risk to internal security just as there is in the case of those listed on the Security Index. You asked if these individuals would, therefore, be placed on the Security Index. If an alien is considered sufficiently dangerous to be placed on the Security Index at the time he is brought to the United States by another Government agency, it is suggested that you may wish to bring this to our attention so that we may include him on the Security Index. If facts are developed after the alien's entry into the United States indicating that he is a threat to the internal security and if such information is brought to our attention, we will refer the matter to you for your information and for your recommendation as to whether he should then be included on the Security Index. In both instances it is believed that the sponsoring agency should be made responsible to know the alien's whereabouts at all times and to control his activities and that the Bureau's only responsibility should be to effect an apprehension in the event of an emergency.

RECEIVED  
DEC 15 1954





UNRECORDED  
11-29-54

Attorney General

Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization

Representation on an Ad Hoc Group on special  
visa cases, Operations Coordinating Board

Attention: Mr. [redacted]

This has reference to Mr. J. Edgar Hoover's memorandum to you of November 12, 1954, concerning representation on an Ad Hoc group on special visa cases, Operations Coordinating Board.

This is to advise that the Service agrees with the suggestion made by Mr. Hoover that in the case of any alien brought to the United States on the basis of a recommendation made by the Operations Coordinating Board that such cases should be brought to the attention of Mr. Hoover so that they may be included in the security indices where the information contained in the cases seems to warrant such action.

(K) SECURITY INDEX - COMSAB TABBING -- The Comsab classification has been set up within the priority apprehension program for the purpose of providing ready identification of those Security Index subjects who, because of special training, employment or past acts of violence, possess the potential of saboteurs in the event of a national emergency. The fact that the Security Index card for a subject has been tabbed Comsab is one of the reasons the subject is also tabbed Detcom to indicate the subject should be apprehended prior to other Security Index subjects whose cards are not so tabbed. As the number of Security Index subjects has increased there has been a corresponding increase in the number of subjects designated for priority of apprehension.

Under present instructions in Section 870 of the Manual of Instructions, one of the reasons for the Comsab tabbing is when a Security Index subject is a veteran of the military services of any country and particularly the Abraham Lincoln Brigade. Henceforth, you should continue to tab for Comsab all veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade. Veterans of the military services of any country are no longer to be tabbed Comsab based on military service alone.

However, you should be certain all subjects of Security Index cards are considered under the Comsab program when the investigations have developed information concerning specific previous training or violent tendencies indicating the subjects possess the potential to be saboteurs. In that connection each case must be considered on the facts developed in the particular case.

The above amends the instruction relating to the basis for considering a subject under the Comsab program because of military service. There are no changes in the other reasons for considering the Comsab classification as outlined in the Manual of Instructions.

In order to adjust the Security Index cards tabbed Comsab in your office in accordance with the above instructions it will be necessary to review each case so tabbed in order to delete the tabbings when based on military service alone. Form FD-122 should be submitted to the Bureau to delete any change necessary. Offices with a relatively small number of Security Index cards tabbed Comsab should review each case file for such subjects at this time. Offices with a large number of cards so tabbed may desire to review the case files at the time the residence addresses and places of employment are verified during the next six months. As soon as the reviews have been

12/14/54  
SAC LETTER NO. 54-70

UNRECORDED  
12-14-54

completed you should advise the Bureau by a memorandum captioned as above indicating the appropriate adjustments have been made. In any event all offices must complete the review and advise the Bureau by June 15, 1955.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

12/14/54  
SAC LETTER NO. 54-70

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: 12/23/54

4 TO :

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX - Cont

During the past week 46 cards were added to the Security Index and 13 cards were cancelled, a net increase of 33 cards.

The Security Index count as of today is 26,473.

ACTION:

None. This is for your information.

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI ( ) DATE: 12/21/54

FROM : SAC, LOS ANGELES ( )

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX - COMSAB TABBING

Re SAC Letter 54-70 dated 12/14/54, Section K.

Referenced SAC Letter reflects that veterans of the military service of any country (except veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade) are no longer to be tabbed Comsab based on such military service alone.

Since Section 37(c) of the Manual of Instructions formerly specifically provided Comsab tabbing for veterans of military service of any country, and further, Decon tabbing for "all individuals included under the Comsab classification." In accordance with referenced SAC Letter, Los Angeles will also delete Decon tabbing as well as Comsab for all veterans with military service except in those cases where individual facts would warrant retaining such tabbing.

Los Angeles will comply with instructions set forth in referenced SAC Letter during the forthcoming six-month period of residence and employment verifications and advise the Bureau by 6/15/55.

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: 12/21/54

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX CARD STATISTICS

There are attached two copies of a table showing by Field Office the total number of Security Index Cards in our files. This table indicates the nationalistic tendency, the dangerousness classification, sex, race, citizenship, and others on one of the "Special Data." A key to the abbreviations is also included.

These statistics are based on Statistical Section records as of December 15, 1954.

Attachments

KEY TO ABBREVIATIONS USED IN SECURITY INDEX

AL Alien  
CS Comsab  
DC Detcom  
KF Key Figure

NA Naturalized  
NB Native Born  
TF Top Functionary  
UN Unknown

AEP Atomic Energy Program Employees  
BUL Bulgarian  
COM Communist Party, USA  
ESP Espionage Subjects

FGE Foreign Government Employees  
GOV United States Government Employees  
HUN Hungarian  
ISL Independent Socialist League

JFG Johnson Forest Group  
MCI Muslim Cult of Islam  
MIS Miscellaneous  
NPR Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico

PPA Proletarian Party of America  
RUS Russian  
SUA Socialist Union of America  
SWP Socialist Workers' Party

UNE United Nations Employees  
UPR Union of the People for the Establishment  
of the Republic of Puerto Rico  
YUG Yugoslavian

ENC 1





*Office Memorandum* • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO

DATE: December 20,  
1954

FROM

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX - *4*

As a result of the review of certain Security Index cases, you have requested the comments of the Internal Security Section on questions raised regarding the following four cases.

Each of the four cases has been carefully reviewed and analyzed. The observations of the Internal Security Section are set out following each case write-up.

ACTION:

This is submitted pursuant to your request.

Office Memorandum

12 • UNITED STATES

GOVERNMENT

DATE: 12/17/54

TO :

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX PROGRAM

Pursuant to your telephonic request to the Los Angeles, Newark, New York, San Francisco and Washington Field Offices, to submit a memorandum concerning the present standards and criteria for listing individuals on the Security Index, replies have been received.

The replies have been carefully analyzed and comments and recommendations on pertinent points are set out hereinafter.

LOS ANGELES DIVISION

The SAC at Los Angeles by memorandum dated December 9, 1954, advised that the criteria set forth in Section 87C of the Manual of Instructions have always been utilized as a basis for determining who should be included in the Security Index. The SAC states that the criteria set forth in that Manual are most comprehensive and furnished logical, practical and workable guide for the appraisal of the dangerousness of an individual considered for inclusion on the Security Index. He stated that none of the criteria has ever been considered unjust.

1. The SAC discussed additional criteria which he stated actually are contained in the spirit of the instructions included in the Manual. He stated that the following additional criteria may be used to justify placing or retaining an individual in the Security Index: (a) Individuals who refuse to cooperate and are obviously hostile when attempts are made to interview them; (b) Individuals who are seemingly cooperative but furnish false information or half-truths either in an effort to mislead or to establish themselves as double agents; (c) Individuals who seemingly cooperate but obviously are withholding information or furnishing only information which is already public knowledge through the press or through public testimony of others. (d) Another group of individuals are those who are willing to cooperate concerning their own Communist Party activity but refuse to name or furnish information concerning others. In respect to this group, he said

that it becomes a matter of degree but that as a general rule such a person should not be included on the Security Index merely for his refusal to name others.

In connection with the above he stated that the factors indicated are not being suggested as additional criteria but as a standard to be applied in every case, particularly in "borderline cases."

OBSERVATIONS:

All of the above factors are considered following the interview of every Security Index subject or subjects of security investigations who are not included on the Security Index. The situations outlined by the SAC at Los Angeles are not standards or criteria for placing individuals on the Security Index but are merely factors to be considered along with all the facts in each case to arrive at a logical conclusion justifying retaining or adding names to the Security Index. The basic standard or criteria upon which we base justification for a Security Index card must be facts relating to subversive activities. In the absence of basic subversive elements, we would have no justification for placing an individual on the Security Index whether he will talk to us on interview or not.

The Domestic Intelligence Division does not agree with the SAC's statement that as a general rule a person should be included on the Security Index merely for his refusal to name others, (with whom he was engaged in subversive activities). Although this obviously must be a factor to be considered, there must in every case be basic elements of subversive activity upon which Security Index justification is based.

2. On page three in paragraph five of the Los Angeles letter the following comment is made: "Likewise, it is believed that consideration should be given to removing persons from the Security Index who, because of advanced age, illness, psychopathic condition, or other infirmities such as blindness, no longer can reasonably be considered dangerous because of their inability to be of any practical use to the revolutionary group. Each such case must, of course, be considered on his own merits."

OBSERVATIONS:

The infirmities mentioned above are presently considered when weighing all the facts in any security case to determine dangerousness or potential dangerousness. These factors are considered at all times in weighing all the facts developed in the investigation. At no time can those factors be arbitrarily considered as the controlling factors in deciding that a person is not potentially dangerous. Persons with



psychopathic ailments can be more dangerous than others. The same reasoning would apply to persons in ill health or advanced in age, depending on the extent of their Communist Party training.

RECOMMENDATION REGARDING LOS ANGELES LETTER:

If you approve, there is attached a letter to the Los Angeles Office, in connection with Item #1 above, pointing out that the attitudes of security subjects on interview are not to be considered as criteria for adding names to the Security Index but are merely factors to be considered along with all the other factors developed in the cases. In addition, it is also being pointed out to the Los Angeles Office that the Bureau disagrees with the comment that as a general rule a person should not be included in the Security Index merely for his refusal to name others, explaining that the basis for adding a name to the Security Index must be on subversive activity in accordance with the criteria outlined in the Manual of Instructions with the degree of cooperation during interview considered along with all other factors.

NEWARK DIVISION

The SAC at Newark has submitted numerous recommendations, most of which deal with interviewing subjects in various categories in an attempt to determine their attitudes or sympathies prior to adding their names to the Security Index. The various suggestions are being commented upon separately.

1. Individuals Who have Knowledge of or Who have Engaged in Espionage for a Foreign Power

The SAC at Newark suggests that such individuals be included in the Security Index as they now are under present instructions. He states that consideration should be given to the desirability of allowing such subjects to remain at large if it would best serve the interest of our espionage investigations. He stated that it may be desirable to maintain a separate list of such individuals and at the time of the emergency an evaluation made as to the desirability of apprehending such subjects.

OBSERVATIONS:

At the present time the espionage subdivision of the Special Section is set up specifically to set aside in one group espionage subjects who should not be apprehended at the time of an emergency, when their apprehension will destroy chances of penetration and control of an operating espionage parallel or would destroy known chances of penetration and control of a "sleeper" parallel. Such



instructions are presently outlined in the Manual of Instructions.

2. Membership of Basic Revolutionary Organization Subsequent to January 1, 1949

Newark suggests interviewing all subjects of security investigations active in a basic revolutionary organization since January 1, 1949, whether they are on the Security Index or have not been added. The SAC believes that the interview program should be broadened to cover all such individuals unless it is felt that an individual is a rabid member of the organization and an interview would not be advisable.

OBSERVATIONS:

The Domestic Intelligence Division does not agree with the recommendation. Appropriate attention is being given to the interview of active Communists, when felt desirable, under our Security Informant Program. Unless a field office believes that the interview is desirable under the Security Informant Program in an effort to develop an informant, there appears to be no logical reason to justify automatically interviewing all subversives. Our Security Informant Program is reaching into this group of individuals on a selective and planned basis.

3. Membership in Basic Revolutionary Organizations or Subversive Activity Prior to January 1, 1949.

The Newark Division in this group of cases recommends that if the subversive activity is prior to January 1, 1949, the subject should be interviewed to determine his sympathies prior to adding his name to the Security Index and that individuals already on the Security Index whose last known subversive activity is prior to January 1, 1949, should be interviewed for the same purpose.

OBSERVATIONS:

In connection with Newark's recommendation that subjects who are not on the Security Index and are not known to have engaged in subversive activities since January 1, 1949, should be interviewed, it is called to your attention that under present instructions such subjects can be interviewed with Bureau authority when the investigation is inconclusive as to the subject's sympathies, the investigation reflects the subject was formerly a member of or affiliated with revolutionary organizations and has subsequently discontinued his membership or associations or the investigation reflects the subject engaged in routine subversive activities a number of years ago but no current evidence of subversive activities had been developed. The

field is instructed that the interview must be considered in each instance where a Security Index card is not being recommended. In connection with Newark's recommendation that all persons on the Security Index, in which no subversive activity has been reported since January 1, 1949, should be interviewed, your attention is called to the fact that recommendations in that connection have been considered by the Executives' Conference. Many of the individuals in that category have been interviewed under present instructions. The interviews have been made on a selective basis and not automatically.

#### 4. Uncooperative Interviews

Newark advised that as of December 9, 1954, there were 866 individuals on the Security Index in the Newark Division. Of these individuals 109 were housewives, "some of whom were placed on the Security Index because they were uncooperative when interviewed." The SAC recommends that refusal of an individual to be cooperative when interviewed should not be considered as a primary reason for including the subject on the Security Index and that it is believed various individuals who have not been cooperative when interviewed including housewives, aged persons or persons in ill health are not potential threats to the security of the United States and should not be included in the Security Index at this time.

#### OBSERVATIONS:

As previously pointed out under the comments regarding the memorandum received from the Los Angeles Office, individuals are not placed on the Security Index because they are uncooperative when interviewed although the attitude of an individual upon interview is a fact to be considered. The basic subversive elements must be present to justify the Security Index cards and the refusal of an individual to be cooperative on interview certainly should not be considered as a primary reason for including the name of the subject in the Security Index. It is only one of the factors considered in the light of the individual's known subversive activities as is the condition of the individual's health. The fact that the subject is a housewife in itself has no bearing in the matter, as we have instances in which housewives have

assumed positions of leadership in the Communist movement. The above facts are being called to the attention of the Newark Office in the attached memorandum.

5. Membership or Activities in Front Organizations Only

Newark suggests that before adding a name to the Security Index for an individual whose subversive activities have been limited to membership activities or leadership in one or more front organizations since the outbreak of Korean hostilities, the individual should be interviewed prior to a recommendation being made for inclusion on the Security Index.

OBSERVATIONS:

Under present instructions if an individual is being considered for the Security Index and questions are raised as to the subject's sympathies or defection from the subversive movement, the field office must consider such a subject for interview if a Security Index card is not being recommended. However, if an individual not presently on the Security Index is currently active in a front organization in a leadership capacity or is engaged in carrying out the aims and purposes of the front organization, it is the opinion of the Domestic Intelligence Division that such an individual is potentially dangerous and should be placed on the Security Index without being interviewed. There appears to be no reason as to why such a person should be interviewed unless the individual is considered under the Security Informant Program for possible development as a security informant.

6. Espousing the Line of Subversive Organizations Since the Korean Hostilities

The Newark Office recommends that all individuals should be interviewed prior to including their names on the Security Index, who although not members of or associated with one of the basic revolutionary organizations or front groups, continues to adhere to the policies and doctrines of the subversive organizations since the outbreak of Korean hostilities.

OBSERVATIONS:

The same observations apply as under Item 5 above. If there are doubts as to a subject's sympathies, present instructions require the subject be interviewed in an effort to determine the individual's sympathies.

7. Persons with Anarchist or Revolutionary Beliefs

There are individuals who adhere to anarchist or revolutionary beliefs who are not affiliated with any revolutionary organization but who are likely to cease upon an opportunity presented by an emergency to further their anarchist beliefs. Newark recommends that all such persons be interviewed prior to including their names on the Security Index.

OBSERVATIONS:

The same observations apply as under Item 5 above. The Domestic Intelligence Division does not believe that such individuals should automatically be interviewed but should be considered for interview under present instructions when the individual's sympathies cannot be fully determined from the facts developed.

8. Setting Up Special Index for Housewives, Aged or Infirm Persons

Newark states that individuals falling under Items 2 through 7 above who have been interviewed, including housewives, aged persons and persons in ill health, and are not believed to be potential threats to the security of the United States at this time should not be included in the Security Index. Newark recommends that such persons be included in a group to be considered for priority investigation in the event of outbreak of hostilities at which time they would be reinterviewed and a decision made as to whether they are potentially dangerous.

OBSERVATIONS:

The Domestic Intelligence Division does not agree with this recommendation. It should be determined at this time whether such persons are potentially dangerous and if they are, their names should be included on the Security Index. If it is determined they are not potentially dangerous at this time, no further action should be taken unless subsequent subversive information concerning them is developed. Of course, their names will appear in the Communist index in the field office which lists all persons against whom any subversive information has been developed.



9. Underground Subjects Not Known To Be Members of Basic Revolutionary Organizations

Newark states that subjects who have engaged in underground activity but who are not known to be members of basic revolutionary organizations should be considered the same as espionage subjects, not interviewed and included on the Security Index. Newark suggests setting them apart in a separate index such as the Special Section where they will receive individual consideration at the time of an emergency to determine whether they should remain at large inasmuch as it may be desirable to keep them under observations while they are engaged in underground operations.

OBSERVATIONS:


At the present time any person engaged in underground activities of any type is included in the Security Index whether they are a member of a revolutionary organization or not. The Domestic Intelligence Division does not agree with the recommendation that they should be set apart to be considered at the time of an emergency as to whether they remain at large. These individuals are definitely dangerous and if they are not apprehended as rapidly as possible in an emergency we would permit dangerous persons being at large to commit sabotage, espionage or any other phases of the Communist conspiracy. It is believed that they should be apprehended as rapidly as possible because due to their underground training they may disappear or be difficult to locate.

RECOMMENDATION REGARDING NEWARK LETTER:

If you approve there is attached a letter to the Newark Division reiterating and explaining the purpose of the espionage subdivision of the Special Section of the Security Index. We are pointing out that individuals are not placed on the Security Index because of their uncooperative attitude when interviewed but on the nature and extent of their subversive activities, the results of the interview being but one factor to be considered in the light of all developments in the case.

NEW YORK DIVISION

The SAC at New York was advised that supervisors handling security matter investigations feel that the present guides or standards for placing individuals on the Security Index are good but that individual cases pose individual problems which were considered at a conference of thirteen Assistant Supervisors, Staff Supervisor Marchessault and ASAC Moore. Problems that were considered are as follows:



1. The date, January 1, 1949, is included in our present criteria subsequent to which association or membership in the subversive organization is sufficient to justify a Security Index card. The majority of those attending the New York conference believe that the date should be changed to January 1, 1950, with ASAC Moore voting in the minority.

OBSERVATIONS:

The Domestic Intelligence Division believes that there should be no change in the date since this date is specifically set out under the detention provisions of the Internal Security Act of 1950. Although the Attorney General has advised that arrests in an emergency will be made under the Attorney General's Program rather than the Internal Security Act of 1950, it is believed that we are on safe grounds in using the January 1, 1949, date.

2. The question was considered as to whether subjects who are aged and infirmed should not be included in the Security Index if not currently active in the Communist Party or front organizations. The majority of the conference believed that such persons should not be included in the Security Index with Staff Supervisor Marchessault and ASAC Moore opposing. The majority felt that the Bureau should not be expending manpower during an emergency on such persons.

OBSERVATIONS:

The Domestic Intelligence Division does not believe that any hard and fast rule can be set up in regard to aged and infirmed persons since in many instances their backgrounds indicate that they are extremely dangerous. Each case must be considered on its own merits in the light of all facts developed. The age of an individual or infirmities are only factors to be considered.

3. The problem was considered as to whether individuals should be placed on Security Index based on association with subversives alone when there is no evidence of subversive activity on the part of the subject. Only three of the Agents participating in the conference agreed with this suggestion.

OBSERVATIONS:

The Domestic Intelligence Division believes that association alone is not sufficient to warrant a Security Index card. We must have evidence of subversive activity on the part of the subject to justify an apprehension.

4. The New York conference unanimously recommended that persons should be added to the Security Index, who assist the Communist Party by supplying cars, meeting places, etc. for the underground activity of the Party.

OBSERVATIONS:

The Domestic Intelligence Division agrees and this is the present practice.

5. The problem was considered that when there has been no recent subversive activity developed but there is subversive activity in 1949 or early 1950, only a preliminary investigation should be conducted and the subject interviewed. Based on the results of the interview the case would be closed or investigation completed to determine if the subject should be placed on the Security Index. Those considering this problem in New York Office unanimously favor such action.

OBSERVATIONS:

The Domestic Intelligence Division definitely disagrees to such a procedure. Without an investigation the interview would be premature and the interviewing Agents would not be in a position to know whether the individual is disclosing all of his activities or not. Under such a procedure many cases might be turned down for inclusion in the Security Index when, as a matter of fact, complete investigation might dictate contrary action. There appears to be no substitute for conducting thorough and complete security investigations after which an interview should be conducted if warranted.

6. The problem was considered where a person is on the Security Index and there is no subversive activity on the part of the spouse, the spouse should be interviewed and if he or she refuses to cooperate during the interview, he or she should be placed on the Security Index as potentially dangerous. The majority of those considering this problem at New York were opposed to such action.

OBSERVATIONS:

The Domestic Intelligence Division agrees with the majority at New York opposing this suggestion because each case must stand on its own and the spouse should not be added to the Security Index merely because the wife or husband is engaged in subversive activities. There must be subversive elements in every case to justify the Security Index card.

7. The problem was considered that the fact a person has served in the Armed Forces of any country should not be considered in connection with the placing of an individual on the Security Index if he is not known to have been a member of a basic revolutionary organization subsequent to January 1, 1949.

Eleven of the fifteen considering the problem at New York believed that the fact that the persons served in the Armed Forces should be considered as a factor even though they have not been active in subversive organizations since January 1, 1949.

OBSERVATIONS:

The Domestic Intelligence Division agrees with the majority that the fact an individual has served in the Armed Forces is a fact to be considered. Prior to placing an individual of this type on the Security Index under present instructions, the field must consider an interview due to the long period of inactivity and based on all facts after the interview, determination is made as to whether a Security Index card is warranted.

8. The New York Office pointed out that there was a distinction between absolute refusal to cooperate on interview and refusal to furnish information based on the principle the subject does not believe he should furnish information concerning friends and associates.

OBSERVATIONS:

There is no question but that there are degrees of cooperation upon interview and we know that in many locations Party members have received instructions as to what they should say when interviewed. All of these factors must be considered and seldom are two cases alike. Problems concerning the results of interviews are being considered by the Executives Conference.

SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

The airtel received from San Francisco in this matter has been carefully reviewed and presents no particular problem differing from our present criteria or interpretations of the criteria. San Francisco believes that every conceivable investigative technique must be utilized to obtain all possible subversive information concerning which observation the Domestic Intelligence Division is in full agreement. San Francisco points out that special attention should be afforded to security subjects employed in the Government or in key facilities which observation is correct and the necessity for affording such cases thorough attention has been called to the field on many occasions.

WASHINGTON FIELD DIVISION

The memorandum received from the SAC, Washington Field Division, has been carefully reviewed. The memorandum stresses the necessity for conducting searching investigations in order that a proper determination can be made as to whether an individual can be placed on the Security Index. The SAC states that "border-line cases" should be resolved in placing the individuals on the Security Index. The Domestic Intelligence Division agrees with that observation. Individuals who have taken positive steps to engage in subversive activities and have not taken positive steps to remove the cloud either during interviews or otherwise should be considered potentially dangerous in an emergency.

OVER-ALL RECOMMENDATIONS:

The memoranda from the five SACs followed the general pattern and practice now in use regarding placing individuals on the Security Index. As indicated above, if you approve, there are attached memoranda to the Special Agents in Charge at Los Angeles and Newark.

1810

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: December 20  
1954

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX —  
Bufile

(9)

There is attached a letter to Albany and all offices which we transmit to the field quarterly to reconcile the Security Index in each office with the Index at the Seat of Government.

The original of the attached letter is on plastiplate and the letter may be obtained for initialing by calling Extension 2355.



list

1810

SAC, Albany

December 22, 1954

RECORDED - 17

Director, FBI (██████████)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

SECURITY INDEX

There is attached hereto for each office an alphabetical list of its Security Index subjects prepared from the Bureau's Security Index as of December 15, 1954. Each subject is identified by name, race, sex and date of birth. The subjects carried in the various subdivisions of the Special Section are listed on separate pages under the appropriate headings. It is requested that this list be used to reconcile the Security Index in your office with the Index at the Seat of Government by checking the names on the list against your Security Index cards.

Attachment

- |                              |                                  |
|------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| 2 cc-Albuquerque (w/attach)  | 2 cc-Milwaukee (w/attach)        |
| 2 cc-Anchorage (w/attach)    | 2 cc-Minneapolis (w/attach)      |
| 2 cc-Atlanta (w/attach)      | 2 cc-Mobile (w/attach)           |
| 2 cc-Baltimore (w/attach)    | 2 cc-Newark (w/attach)           |
| 2 cc-Birmingham (w/attach)   | 2 cc-New Haven (w/attach)        |
| 2 cc-Boston (w/attach)       | 2 cc-New Orleans (w/attach)      |
| 2 cc-Buffalo (w/attach)      | 2 cc-New York (w/attach)         |
| 2 cc-Butte (w/attach)        | 2 cc-Norfolk (w/attach)          |
| 2 cc-Charlotte (w/attach)    | 2 cc-Oklahoma City (w/attach)    |
| 2 cc-Chicago (w/attach)      | 2 cc-Omaha (w/attach)            |
| 2 cc-Cincinnati (w/attach)   | 2 cc-Philadelphia (w/attach)     |
| 2 cc-Cleveland (w/attach)    | 2 cc-Phoenix (w/attach)          |
| 2 cc-Dallas (w/attach)       | 2 cc-Pittsburgh (w/attach)       |
| 2 cc-Denver (w/attach)       | 2 cc-Portland (w/attach)         |
| 2 cc-Detroit (w/attach)      | 2 cc-Richmond (w/attach)         |
| 2 cc-El Paso (w/attach)      | 2 cc-St. Louis (w/attach)        |
| 2 cc-Honolulu (w/attach)     | 2 cc-Salt Lake City (w/attach)   |
| 2 cc-Houston (w/attach)      | 2 cc-San Antonio (w/attach)      |
| 2 cc-Indianapolis (w/attach) | 2 cc-San Diego (w/attach)        |
| 2 cc-Kansas City (w/attach)  | 2 cc-San Francisco (w/attach)    |
| 2 cc-Knoxville (w/attach)    | 2 cc-San Juan (w/attach)         |
| 2 cc-Little Rock (w/attach)  | 2 cc-Savannah (w/attach)         |
| 2 cc-Los Angeles (w/attach)  | 2 cc-Seattle (w/attach)          |
| 2 cc-Louisville (w/attach)   | 2 cc-Springfield (w/attach)      |
| 2 cc-Memphis (w/attach)      | 2 cc-Washington Field (w/attach) |
| 2 cc-Miami (w/attach)        |                                  |

RECEIVED

WGO:mjt

original on Plastiplate

*[Handwritten signatures and initials]*

In checking this list against your Security Index the following items should be considered and handled as follows:

1. If the name of a subject on the attached list is not included in your Security Index, you should check that subject's case file to determine his correct Security Index status. An appropriate notation should be placed adjacent to the subject's name on the enclosed list reflecting the correct Security Index status for the subject. If his name should be deleted from the Bureau's Security Index the notation should refer to the previous communication from your office which recommended cancellation. If you do not have a Security Index card for the subject and a card should be in your Index, the notation should request the Bureau to forward cards to your office.

2. If this check discloses the names of subjects in your Security Index which do not appear on the attached list, the names of such subjects and the Bureau file number (where known) should be set forth on a separate sheet of paper with the date that the subject was recommended for inclusion in the Security Index. Instances of this nature will occur in those cases where subjects have recently been recommended for inclusion in the Index and were not included therein at the time of printing of the attached list but cards have subsequently been prepared at the Bureau. Instances of this nature may also occur in those cases where cancellation of a Security Index card has recently been recommended by you and you have not yet received Bureau authorization to cancel.

3. In checking the Special Section of your Security Index against the attached list you should be certain that the subjects are in the same subdivision as those indicated on the attached list. Appropriate notations should be placed on the attached list if there are any discrepancies between your Special Section and the list.

4. To avoid an increasing number of discrepancies between the attached list and your Security Index due to current changes being made in the Security Index, this check must be instituted immediately and completed within 10 days of the receipt of this memorandum by each office. Upon completion, the attached list and appropriate notations should be returned to the Bureau by cover memorandum under instant caption.





## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: 12/13/54

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX -  
INTERVIEWS OF SUBJECTS  
Bufile

As you know the Internal Security Act of 1950, in Section 109 (h) (3), provides that in deciding the question regarding the detention of individuals in a national emergency, the Attorney General, any preliminary hearing officer and the board of detention review are authorized to consider evidence of the following: "Activity in the espionage or sabotage operations of, or the holding at any after time after January 1, 1949, of membership in, the Communist Party of the United States or any other organization or political party which seeks to overthrow or destroy by force and violence the Government of the United States or any of its political subdivisions and the substitution therefor of a totalitarian dictatorship controlled by a foreign government." Further, the Attorney General's Portfolio which sets out the plan on which our Emergency Detention Program is based in Section 3a contains broad language in defining the persons to be detained and contains the statement that a detainee is to be an individual "who the Attorney General has reason to believe is potentially dangerous to the national defense or the public safety of the United States, is likely to foster, encourage or promote the policies, programs or objectives of the enemies of the United States, or collaborate with the enemies of the United States, or is likely to engage in treason, espionage, sabotage or any other activity inimical or detrimental to the defense of the United States and to the public safety of its citizens, nationals or legal residents."

Under our responsibilities in connection with the Emergency Detention Program, we have listed a total of 26,303 persons in our Security Index as of December 3, 1954. In making decisions in the individual cases as to whether the subjects should be added to the Security Index, we have taken into consideration the provisions of the Internal Security Act of 1950 as quoted above and have been guided by deliberations within the Bureau and in consultation with the Department.

Inactivity of Subjects

No problem is presented in the cases wherein the subjects have been identified with the Communist Party or other revolutionary groups within the recent past. They clearly fall within the category to be apprehended. A more difficult question is presented, however, in those instances in which the subjects have, in fact, been reliably reported as members of the Communist Party or other revolutionary groups in the past but no information is received subsequently to indicate that they still subscribe to revolutionary doctrines.

Our approach to these cases, as approved by the Executives' Conference on May 22, 1951, has been to continue these persons on the Security Index as long as there is no affirmative evidence of their defection. The possibility always exists in these cases that the subjects may be "sleepers" who have deliberately withdrawn from active participation in the Communist Party.

We know it to be a fact that the Communist Party has embarked upon a "4-5-year plan" to establish a new Communist Party underground apparatus comprised of persons who are not publicly known as Party members. This is the Party's "colonization" program which was fully discussed in SAC Letter 53-69 of 10/20/53. The latter states: "Such persons will be relocated in new areas with instructions to obtain employment in industry, to assume merely 'mildly radical' views in labor unions and not to make contact with the local Communist Party."

Investigation by the Buffalo Office in recent months has uncovered a number of subjects who are a part of the Communist Party "colonization" program. Attached are memoranda setting out information concerning these typical subjects, ----- These subjects, like most of the others identified by the Buffalo Office, came from New York City. (See attachments 1, 2, and 3)

In other words, it is inherent under the "colonization" program that these subjects draw as little attention to themselves as possible. Inactivity, insofar as the open Party and active front groups are concerned, is a basic part of the Party discipline adhered to by these subjects.

-----  
The Philadelphia Office has furnished a graphic example of the CP injunction against open activities when an underground assignment is contemplated. Philadelphia informant ----- on April 16, 1954, reported that he had been instructed by -----,

a CP leader in the Philadelphia Division, not to attend any CP or CP front group meetings unless authorized to do so by . . . The latter also advised the informant that the informant's name was being removed from any CP or CP front group mailing lists. . . also instructed the informant not to pay any dues or to make contributions to any front groups. . . indicated that the informant was being considered for a future assignment in the CP and for that reason should not be "openly" associated with the CP in any manner.

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Another category of subjects aside from the "colonizers" or active participants in the CP underground, who have recently come to notice are long-time Security Index subjects, relatively inactive over a period of time, who have been identified through confidential techniques as implicated in the CP underground as suppliers of housing and transportation. It is significant to note that such cases give impetus to the proposition that these subjects are dangerous until they indicate otherwise. In other words, inactivity is a misleading criteria by which to judge the dangerousness of our subjects. Attached are examples of three subjects in this category, discussed in detail in attached memoranda numbers 4, 5 and 6.

It would seem desirable in these cases to take such steps as we can to resolve the question of continued Communist sympathies of these inactive subjects. Thus, the matter is resolved to the simple question as to whether or not we should promulgate a policy whereby the cases of inactive subjects are uniformly studied by the field, looking toward interviews in all such cases in an affirmative attempt to clarify the potential dangerousness of these individuals. The interviews which have been conducted in Security Index cases have been found of great assistance in resolving this question. Our interviews to this point have not been mandatory but have been conducted on a selective basis in the field with particular emphasis placed upon those subjects representing informant potential and where there were indications of outright defection.

Examples of Inactivity Where No Interview Has Been Conducted

Set out hereinafter are some examples wherein the subjects have not been reported active in subversive movements in recent years and yet no indications of defection have come to our attention.

We are recommending that consideration be given as, as noted previously, that interviews be conducted with those subjects whose inactivity in Communist matters extends over a period of years. Specifically, it is our proposal that the field be instructed to review all their Security Index cases in which there have been no indications of Communist Party affiliations since January 1, 1949.



Cases in Which Interviews Have Already Been Conducted

As stated above, there have been many instances in which interviews have resolved Security Index cases. The most obvious example is, of course, the Security Index subject who upon approach by our Agents makes a complete revelation of his past activities and furnishes valuable intelligence data concerning other security subjects. Depending upon the circumstances, such a subject is either used as a confidential source or steps are taken to reactivate him in the Communist Party as an informant. In these clear cut cases we cancel the Security Index cards.

Interviews with Security Index subjects, however, which produce less than full cooperation give rise to some difficulty in completely resolving the question of continued sympathies with or affiliations in the Communist Party. These types of interviews may be considered in the following categories:

- A. The subject is either hostile, completely uncooperative or refuses to discuss the subject of Communism with the interviewing Agents.
- B. The subject admits in varying degrees his own Communist activities but refuses to divulge any information implicating other persons. (See attached memorandum number 7 regarding CP instructions to feign cooperation.)
- C. Subject denies subversive activities yet our files fully indicate that the subject is not telling the truth.

Interviews with Subjects on the Security Index

Set out hereinafter are the identities of Security Index subjects who upon interview evidenced reactions of the type specified in A, B and C above. A brief resume of each of these interviews is noted hereinafter and separate memoranda are attached giving a fuller history of each case mentioned.

Interviews with Security Subjects which led to Recommendations  
for the Security Index

Set out hereinafter are the identities of subjects who at the time of interview were not included in the Security Index. As a result of the interviews, however, recommendations have been or are being made to include them in the Security Index. These cases are listed below according to the reaction to the interview as noted previously. Detailed data concerning these subjects are set out on attached memoranda:

OBSERVATIONS:

It will be seen that in the <sup>Latter category of</sup> cases cited above the circumstances involved were entirely analogous with those mentioned previously except that the subjects in these cases were not included in the Security Index at the time the interviews were conducted. We feel that there should be absolutely no distinction made between Security Index and non-Security Index cases when the basic facts regarding their activities are parallel. The fortuitous circumstance that the mechanical steps of placing an individual in the Security Index have already been taken should, it is felt, have no bearing upon the question of whether or not the individual is potentially dangerous.

It should be noted that our instructions at the present time are geared toward interviews with non-Security Index subjects. That is to say, under the provisions of the Manual of Instructions, these alternatives are presented; before closing a non-Security Index case the field must either recommend the subject for the Security Index or recommend that the subject be interviewed unless the field can show that an interview is undesirable in given circumstances.

SUMMARY:

We realize that interviews with Security subjects have natural limits insofar as resolving beyond any conceivable doubt the question of a man's sympathies. We do feel, however, that in ascertaining the reaction of a given subject toward cooperation with a Federal agency we are able to obtain an indication as to whether or not he continues to adhere to principles of Communism. Thus, the question is not confined to the proposition did the subject "come clean" with the FBI; rather, the degree of his cooperation with the FBI must be considered in analyzing the basic question of whether the subject continues to subscribe to revolutionary doctrines. After all, the subject by his affirmative actions has identified himself with the Communist movement and the presumption of continued sympathy must prevail until

concrete evidence of defection comes to attention. As is stated previously the Executives Conference has previously adopted this position. The decisions in each of our Security Index cases are weighed in the light of the foregoing consideration and under the framework of policy as promulgated within the Bureau. Each individual case is given careful study and weighed on its merits as construed in the light of existing instructions. Insofar as the interviews are concerned one other point might be mentioned, viz., the opportunity to personally observe the individual subjects and to gage their mental capacities. This, of course, has direct bearing upon the matter of knowledge of the aims and purposes of the Communist Party and assists in determining which of the subjects are "dupes" and which are fully cognizant of the aims of the organization with which they have been identified.

RECOMMENDATION:

(1) That to assist in resolving cases in which there have been no data reported indicating subversive activities since January 1, 1949, the field be instructed to submit requests to interview all subjects in such category unless compelling reasons to the contrary are furnished.

(2) That unless these subjects clearly demonstrate they are no longer affiliated with or sympathetic to the subversive movement with which they have been identified, they be retained in the Security Index.



1812

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: December 14, 1954

TO :

FROM : The Executives Conference

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

The Executives Conference on December 14, 1954, consisting of Messrs. , considered two problems connected with the Security Index.

1. We have interviewed a great many Security Index subjects both for the purpose of developing informants and for the purpose of evaluating the present potential dangerousness of the subjects. There is no requirement, however, that Security Index subjects must be interviewed after an extensive period of inactivity. There are, therefore, relative small number of Security Index Communist or subversive activities for a number of years. They remain on the Index, subject to annual reports bringing their activities up to date. The Domestic Intelligence Division recommends that any subjects concerning whom we have been unable to develop subversive activities subsequent to January 1, 1949, should be required to be interviewed for the purpose of determining their present attitude, to provide a further basis for evaluation as to whether they should continue to be retained on the Security Index. The date, January 1, 1949, is based on the fact that the detention provisions of the Internal Security Act of 1950 refer only to persons connected with subversive activities subsequent to that date.

Executives Conference Recommendations:

The Executives Conference unanimously recommended that instructions be sent to the field requiring that persons on the Security Index on whom we have not developed subversive activities since January 1, 1949, must be interviewed. If you approve, these instructions will be included in an SAC letter.

2. During the interviews with both persons on the Security Index and persons being considered for the Security Index, we have no difficulty in arriving at a decision when the persons interviewed completely cooperate with the Government or when he makes it very plain that he is still a Communist. However, three types of interviews have presented a problem as follows:

A. In interviews where the subject is entirely uncooperative such as refusing to even talk to the interviewing agents;

B. Interviews where the subject cooperates partly by admitting his own past Communist activities but refusing to identify his associates in the Communist Party and refusing to discuss other information in his possession concerning the Communist Party;

C. Interviews wherein subjects pretend to cooperate by lying to the interviewing agents as borne out by definite information in our files.

In all three of these instances, the Domestic Intelligence Division has followed the policy of retaining subjects on the Security Index. In addition, when a subject is being considered for inclusion on the Security Index, and other factors developed during the investigation when considered with the results of these interviews appear to warrant, the subject is placed on the Security Index. In other words, interviews such as the above are considered as factors to be weighed in the placing of a subject on the Security Index.

In following this policy, the Domestic Intelligence Division has borne in mind the fact that the Communist Party has issued "sleeper" instructions to its members whereby certain members are instructed to refrain from open Communist Party activities but rather to remain in a "sleeper" status. In addition, the Communist Party has instructed its members to feign cooperation with interviewing agents (SAC Letter 53-48, dated July 14, 1953, and SAC Letter 53-73, dated November 3, 1953). In these letters, it was pointed out to the field that by feigning cooperation, the Party hoped to discover FBI informants. Also the Party instructed that members should appear cooperative and admit past Party membership and consequently, they would no longer be bothered by the FBI.

Executives Conference Recommendation:

The Executives Conference unanimously recommended that the policy presently being followed of retaining or placing persons on the Security Index when subjects respond to interviews other than b

completely giving cooperation to the Government should be continued. The Conference recommended that during the pending discussions with the Department on the criteria utilized by the Department in reviewing Security Index cases, the policy followed by the Bureau regarding these interviews should be fully explained to secure the Department's views. Thereafter, the discussions with the Department on this point should be set forth in writing in order that we may have in writing from the Department its approval of this procedure. If you agree, this will be done.

GK  
K

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

## Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO :

DATE: 12/28/54

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX - *general* (RS)  
INTERVIEWS OF SUBJECTS  
Bufile

Attached is Executives' Conference memorandum of 12/14/54, reflecting that it has been recommended and approved that instructions be sent to the field requiring that Security Index subjects on whom we have not developed subversive information since January 1, 1949, must be interviewed.

RECOMMENDATION:

There is attached for approval a proposed SAC Letter in which we are instructing the field to review their cases and to submit requests for interviews of their Security Index subjects falling into the above category. We are specifying that all such subjects must be interviewed unless compelling reasons to the contrary exist and in such cases the facts must be furnished to the Bureau. Appropriate Manual changes are attached.

1814

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI ( )

DATE: 12/29/54

FROM : SAC, OMAHA ( )

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX - ~~SECRET~~

ReBulet 12/22/54.

The list of Security Index subjects submitted with relet was checked against those Security Index cards maintained by the Omaha Office and it was found to be identical, with the following exception:

- Bufile -

This case was RUC'd with Form FD-128 to the Seattle Office under date of 12/22/54.



UNRECORDED  
10-8-52

CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION

To : The Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation Date: October 8, 1952  
From : The Attorney General

Subject: PROGRAM FOR APPREHENSION AND DETENTION OF PERSONS  
CONSIDERED POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS TO THE NATIONAL  
DEFENSE AND PUBLIC SAFETY OF THE UNITED STATES. TOP SECRET

Reference is made to the several memoranda and to the conferences which have been held between representatives of the Bureau and of the Department concerning the adoption of standards for Security Index purposes for apprehension of individuals in an emergency.

As you are aware, final approval of the Security Index standards which have been used by the Bureau for a number of years has been withheld pending not only careful study of the standards themselves, but of possible alternative standards. The enactment of the Internal Security Act of 1950 which creates another standard for the enforcement of Title II of the Act has further complicated final determination of standards.

As you know, Title II of the Internal Security Act declares that when a state of Internal Security Emergency is proclaimed by the President, he shall, acting through the Attorney General, apprehend and detain each person as to whom there is reasonable ground to believe that such person probably will engage in, or probably will conspire with others to engage in, acts of espionage or of sabotage. While it is contemplated that in the event of war other legislation relating to the apprehension and detention of potentially dangerous persons will be speedily sought, nevertheless so long as the standard provided in the Internal Security Act of 1950 remains the guiding legislative principle for the apprehension and detention of potentially dangerous individuals, the Department must consider this standard in reviewing the files of individuals who may be subject to apprehension and detention.

After careful study of the application of the standards which have been used by your Bureau in the listing of names on the Security Index List, it is my opinion that these standards can be utilized by your Bureau and by the Criminal Division in meeting the responsibilities of each under the apprehension and detention program. Accordingly, I approve the standards now in use by your Bureau, as related in the next paragraph.

CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION

10-8-52

In your memorandum to the Assistant to the Attorney General of September 16, 1949, you state that the elements going into measuring an individual's potential dangerousness or dangerousness in the event of an emergency consist of two broad elements: (1) membership, affiliation or activity indicating sympathy with the principal tenets of the Communist Party or similar ideological groups and the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico; and (2) a showing of one or more of the following:

- a. activity in the organization, promoting its aims and purposes;
- b. training in the organization, indicating a knowledge of its ultimate aims and purposes;
- c. a position in a mass organization of some kind where his affiliation or sympathy as set forth in element one will determine the destiny of the mass organization;
- d. employment or connection with an industry or facility vital to the national defense health and welfare;
- e. possessing a potential for committing espionage or sabotage.

In your subsequent memorandum of July 27, 1950, you add thereto by stating that as a result of hostilities in Korea and the fact that the Communist Party and related groups have definitely and positively taken a stand against the policy of the United States, you are considering persons for inclusion in the Security Index who are present, active, participating members of the Communist Party or related groups or who actively espouse the line of those groups, regardless of the individual's leadership in the Party, present employment or past activities.

You have raised the further question as to prompt advice to the Bureau when a name has been approved by the Department for inclusion on the Security Index list. I am in agreement with your view that prompt notice should be furnished to the Bureau and I suggest that representatives of the Bureau and of the Criminal Division confer for the purpose of devising the most efficient method of notification consistent with the reviewing program. I have directed the Criminal Division to give priority attention to prominent and nationally known individuals whose names were removed for the time being from the Security Index list as set forth in your memorandum of February 29, 1952.

[REDACTED]  
SECURITY INFORMATION

TRUE COPY

INFORMATION

UNRECORDED  
11-25-52

To : The Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation Date: November 25, 1952  
From : The Attorney General  
Subject: PROGRAM FOR APPREHENSION AND DETENTION OF PERSONS CONSIDERED POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS TO THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AND PUBLIC SAFETY OF THE UNITED STATES.

Reference is made to my memorandum of October 8, 1952, approving the standards used by your Bureau for the listing of names of individuals in the Security Index, and to your subsequent memorandum of October 15,

Pursuant to the questions which you have raised in the latter memorandum, I wish to assure you that it is the Department's intention in the event of emergency to proceed under the program as outlined in the Department's Portfolio invoking the standards now used. This approval, of course, indicates agreement with your Bureau's concepts of the Detention Program and the Security Index standards as outlined in your memorandum of June 26, 1951, to former Deputy Attorney General Ford.

ENCLOSURE

INFORMATION

TRUE COPY

ENCLOSURE



STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DATE: 12/31/54

TO :

FROM :

SUBJECT: SECURITY INDEX

During the past week 37 cards were added to the Security Index and 7 cards were canceled, a net increase of 30 cards.

The Security Index count as of today is 26,503.

ACTION:

None. This is for your information.

